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ARTICLES 
Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: 
The Clash between Intellectual Property 
and the First Amendment from an 
Economic Perspective 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau1 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech and private property rights are among the 
fundamental concepts upon which the United States is built.2 
Freedom of speech favors free dissemination of ideas and 
information.3 From an economic perspective, this encourages the free 
flow of creative ideas and innovations into the marketplace,4 which 
facilitates the development of private economic enterprises. Private 
property rights, in contrast, are based on restricting access to and use 
 
 1 Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. B.S., 
1976, Hofstra University; J.D., 1981, Western New England College; LL.M., 1986, Temple 
University.  Web site: www.law.suffolk.edu/arodau, e-mail: arodau@suffolk.edu. 
 2 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that freedom of speech 
is a fundamental personal liberty); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 
granted, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (stating that one of societys most cherished rights is 
freedom of expression) (quoting American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th 
Cir. 1990)); Fay v. City of Springfield, 94 F.2d 409, 414 (C.C.S.D. Mo. 1899) (holding that 
the right to private property is a fundamental right); King v. Priest, 206 S.W.2d 547, 556 
(Mo. 1947) (finding that freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected from 
abridgement by government); Raskin v. Town of Morristown, 121 A.2d 378, 386 (N.J. 
1956).  See generally Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. The Ideas: The First 
Amendment Challenges to Internet Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 420 (1999) 
(stating freedom of speech and commerce have co-existed in United States for a long time). 
 3 See United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that free 
dissemination of ideas is essential element of democracy). 
 4 [M]arketplace . . . [refers to] a place where buyers and sellers exchange goods and 
services. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE § 1.01, at 1 (1st ed. 1985). 
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of private property.  A property owner is given exclusive 
monopoly-like rights to decide who can access or use her 
property.5  Such rights are also important to the development of 
private economic enterprises.6 
Courts vigorously enforce freedom of speech rights. For example, 
the prior restraint doctrine7 represents a collective rejection of 
preliminary relief 8 when the effect is to restrict speech.9 Typically, 
any injury caused by dissemination of speech is properly redressed in 
an action for damages.10  However, both permanent and preliminary 
injunctive relief is routinely utilized to protect property interests.11  
Often, this represents recognition that money damages will be 
inadequate.12   Additionally,   even   in   the   absence   of    economic 
 
 5 See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 673 (1999) (noting that the hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to 
exclude others.)  See generally infra note 53. See also E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, 
Ltd. Inc., 137 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1943) (stating that although some persons find all 
monopolies objectionable, most societies have allowed monopolies; the question is which 
ones should be allowed). See generally  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:3, at 1-8 (4th ed. 2000) (stating there is a strong 
relationship between economic and personal freedom). Arguably, the term monopoly is not 
generally used to refer to private property rights since it has a negative connotation. See 
infra note 89 (discussing  monopolies). 
 6 See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv. Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993) (stating that [p]rivate ownership is the 
principal incentive for the creation and maintenance of commodities, and for their efficient 
allocation.). 
 7 Governmental action constitutes a prior restraint when it is directed to suppressing 
speech because of its content before the speech is communicated. United States v. Kaun, 
827 F.2d 1144, 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 296) 
(2d Cir. 1985)). Prior restraint is [a] governmental restriction on speech or publication 
before its actual expression. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (7th ed. 1999).  See also 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 148-52 (1982) (discussion 
of the concept of prior restraint). 
 8 Preliminary relief, as used in this article, refers to preliminary injunctions and 
temporary restraining orders. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 148 (1998) (outlining four 
factor test which must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunction). 
 9 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 149-50. 
 10 See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Assn v. Local 100 et al., 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 
2001) (normally injunctive relief not available remedy for defamation). 
 11 See CompuServ Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 
1997) (property owner entitled to injunctive relief to protect property). 
 12 See id. at 1027-28 (injunctive relief available when money damages cannot be 
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damages, injunctive relief may be an appropriate remedy to protect 
the exclusivity of property rights.13 
A conflict between freedom of speech and private property rights 
usually does not arise in the context of real or tangible personal 
property.14  However, intellectual property is more problematic. 
In Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,15 District Court Judge Nancy G. 
Edmunds refused to grant a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
Robert Lane from releasing Fords trade secrets on the Internet.16 
Judge Edmunds found that Ford presented substantial evidence to 
support its claim that the defendant, Mr. Lane, likely violated the 
Michigan  Uniform  Trade  Secrets  Act.17 Nevertheless, she held that 
 
ascertained). 
 13 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1994 (1996) (injunction typically available remedy to 
protect property rights in contrast to damage remedy to protect contract rights). 
 14 Nevertheless, so-called strategic lawsuits against public participation (hereinafter 
SLAPP suits) have been used by land developers against vocal critics of the land 
development.  Some states have, however, adopted anti-SLAPP statutes, and distinguishing 
between legitimate actions and SLAPP suits is difficult.  See Barbara Arco, When Rights 
Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 591 (1998) (noting that SLAPP suits are common in matters dealing 
with environmental issues and real estate development). See generally George W. Pring, 
SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1989) 
(seminal article on SLAPP suits). Usually such suits involve defamation actions, but they 
may also involve business torts, antitrust, nuisance, invasion of privacy and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress actions. See Kathryn W. Tate, Californias Anti-SLAPP 
Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 801, 804 (2000). Most SLAPP suits are meritless. They are brought to coerce or 
intimidate vocal critics into ceasing exercise of their First Amendment rights to speak out. 
See Dora A. Corby, Clearing Up Civil Procedure Section 425.16Delivering the Final 
Knockout Punch to SLAPP Suits, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 459, 460 (1998); see also Jerome I. 
Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 971 (1999) (stating that SLAPP suits chill the right of free 
expression.). 
 15 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 16 Robert Lane operates a website on the Internet, called Blue Oval Newsthe 
Independent Voice of the Ford Community, available at http://www.blueovalnews.com, 
where he posts information about the Ford Motor Company (last visited Oct. 18, 2001). This 
website also contains a review of the lawsuit (see Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 745) by Mr. Lane 
as well as newspaper and other articles about the lawsuit. See generally Michael A. Geist, 
The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. 
REV. 521, 525-30 (1998) (discussing operation and history of Internet). 
 17 Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 746. 
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issuance of the preliminary injunction would be an invalid prior 
restraint of speech in violation of the First Amendment.18 
Judge Edmunds decision is novel.19 Nevertheless, a careful 
examination of the First Amendment in this context is necessary in 
order to balance the underlying policies of the First Amendment with 
the policies underlying protection of intellectual property. 
This article explores the interaction of freedom of speech with the 
need to protect intellectual property.  Part I discusses the underlying 
policy considerations for protecting intellectual property in general, 
and the specific underlying reasons for providing patent, copyright, 
trademark and trade secret protection.  Part II examines the 
importance of protecting both free speech and private property as 
necessary components of our capitalistic economic system.  Part III 
further explores the reasons for protecting both free speech and 
private property and discusses the underlying policy considerations 
regarding the general dislike of prior restraints.  Part IV asserts that a 
balance of these policies necessitates allowing prior restraint of third 
 
 18 Id; but see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, ___ , 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1764-65 (2001) 
(in dicta, court suggests trade secrets are private matters which are less likely to trigger First 
Amendment concerns than information of general interest to public). 
 19 Preliminary relief is usually granted to protect trade secrets from disclosure. See, e.g., 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1263 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding preliminary 
injunction prohibited former PepsiCo employee from working for competitor for a fixed 
time period to prevent inevitable disclosure of PepsiCo trade secrets to competitor); see also 
Standard & Poors Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (stating [i]nterference with access to business confidences and trade secrets is not an 
abridgement of the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.).  
But see DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. Bunner, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1179 (Nov. 1, 2001) 
(court found preliminary injunction to enjoin trade secret disclosure invalid prior restraint 
under First Amendment).  See also State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 
P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996), where the Oregon Supreme Court held that a newsletter publisher 
could not be barred from publishing trade secrets it lawfully obtained prior to a trial on the 
merits. Any preliminary relief was held to be a prior restraint in violation of the state 
constitution because it was based on the content of the speech involved. The court noted that 
the appropriate remedy was injunctive relief or damages after a trial on the merits.  Id. at 
1309.  Nevertheless, the court noted that it was not deciding if the First Amendment would 
require the same result. Id. at 1307 n.6. See generally 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON 
TRADE SECRETS § 14.01[2][a], at 14-26 n.15 (2d ed. 2000) (stating there is a long line of 
authority upholding content-neutral injunctions to protect intellectual property and that such 
injunctive relief is not an impermissible prior restraint.) Id. at 14-26, n.15 (criticizing result 
in Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 745). 
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5 
party use or disclosure of the communicative aspects of intellectual 
property when such action is needed to prevent irreparable harm or 
destruction of the intellectual property. 
Most actions prohibited by patent law are conduct based so First 
Amendment concerns fail to arise.20 Nevertheless, patent law does 
allow a patent owner to prohibit offers to sell her invention. Such an 
offer is a form of commercial speech within the domain of the First 
Amendment.21 Prior restraint theory should prohibit the use of 
preliminary relief to bar such speech prior to a full adjudication on 
the merits since any damage from such speech is minimal and 
subsequently compensable at the conclusion of the trial.  In contrast, 
prior restraint of the property interests embodied in copyrighted 
works and in trademarks should be allowed. Existing limitations in 
the law already strike a balance between protecting the property 
interests while minimizing the impact on free speech rights. Failure 
to permit preliminary relief undermines the incentive to engage in 
creative efforts because, absent such relief, the intellectual property 
can be destroyed or seriously impaired.22  Further, trade secrets, 
despite any expressive component, should be treated as property that 
falls outside the domain of the First Amendment. The very existence 
of a trade secret depends upon maintaining its secrecy.23 Therefore, 
protection of a trade secret via preliminary relief is necessary to 
avoid irreparable destruction of the property prior to any adjudication 
of rights in the trade secret.24 
 
 20 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., infra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 23 See In re Shalala, 996 F.2d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 24 See id. 
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I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS THAT FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Freedom of speech is an essential right in a free society.25  The 
First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech is an important 
mechanism for preserving the ability of the citizenry to engage in 
political speech.26 The ability to criticize the government and 
governmental officials is central to the preservation of a democratic 
state.27 Such a right allows the news media to engage in detailed 
coverage of governmental actions and allows unbridled reporting of 
news events both domestically and internationally.28 Such news 
coverage limits the ability of government to control the 
dissemination of information which is a significant weapon that can 
be used to control the populace.29 Additionally, free expression of 
opinions and ideas allows the marketplace to be the ultimate arbiter 
of what is useful and desirable for society,30 thus promoting 
marketplace competition which is the foundation of a free enterprise 
 
 25 Freedom of speech has been recognized as one of the preeminent rights of Western 
democratic theory, the touchstone of individual liberty. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, 4 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.2, at 243 (5th ed. 1995) (Knights of Ku 
Klux Klan v. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dept., 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1433 (W.D. Ark. 
1992), and Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763, 769 (N.D. Miss. 1980)).  Justice 
Cardozo stated that freedom of thought and speech are indispensable to nearly every other 
form of freedom.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). 
 26 See Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Wash. 1993) (political speech 
protected by First Amendment). 
 27 See Jones v. Battles, 315 F. Supp. 601, 607 (D. Conn. 1970) (criticism important to 
orderly functioning of democracy). 
 28 The importance of allowing the news media to have broad rights to criticize 
government officials (and other public figures) is supported by the application of defamation 
laws to the media when disseminating information about such individuals. The Supreme 
Court has held that such individuals must meet a higher standard than ordinary citizens 
before they can prevail in a defamation action. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 29 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 n.24, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 
n.24 (1974) (governmental control of the press places liberty in jeopardy). 
 30 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) 
([a] primary purpose of the First Amendment was to insure that all ideas would be allowed 
to enter the competition of the market.). Hartman, supra note 2 (discussing the 
marketplace of ideas theory of First Amendment jurisprudence that has been adopted by 
recent judicial decisions dealing with First Amendment issues on the Internet). 
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system.31  Hence, new methods of doing business,32 the introduction 
of new products and services, and new types of creativity can 
flourish.33 
The recognition of private property is also a basic component of a 
free society, especially to a society based on capitalism such as the 
United States.34 This recognition is also essential in modern societies 
where the development of expertise requires division of labor.35  
 
 31 See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1:1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (stating that [f]reedom to engage in business and to 
compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free 
enterprise system.); N. Pac. Ry. Co v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (stating that 
antitrust law was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade); E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-
Warren, Ltd. Inc., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) 
(holding that [t]here is a basic public policy, deep-rooted in our economy and respected by 
the courts, resting on the assumption that social welfare is best advanced by free 
competition. . .). 
 32 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently stated expressly that a new 
method of doing business is intellectual property that can be protected pursuant to patent 
law. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). See generally Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing legislative history, the court stated Congress 
intended statutory subject matter [of patent law] to include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.). 
 33 See Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 1, 4 (stating that [u]nrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) 
(stating that competition in the marketing of goods and services creates incentives to offer 
quality products at reasonable prices and fosters the general welfare by promoting the 
efficient allocation of economic resources.).  See generally Glen Holly Entmt, Inc. v. 
Tektronix, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that antitrust laws 
were designed to promote competition which benefits consumers).  
 34 Existence of property rights is one of the essential differences between capitalism and 
Marxism. See Paul Heckel, Proprietary Rights: The Software-Patent Controversy, 9 No. 12 
COMPUTER/L.J. 13, at 14 (Dec. 1992); see also D. T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF 
ANTITRUST  24 (1972) (stating that U.S. economy primarily utilizes private property). See 
generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 628 (1998) (stating that socialist legal 
systems organized property in a fundamentally different way from private property 
systems); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-13 (1972) (the legal 
protection of property rights has an important economic function: to create incentives to use 
resources efficiently.). 
 35 Division of labor is defined as [t]he process whereby labour is allocated to the 
FINAL.BECKROD 1/10/02  4:24 PM 
8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:1 
 
 
Individuals develop specific skills that are utilized to provide society 
with high-quality goods and services.36 However, these same 
individuals must purchase most necessities, such as food and 
clothing, as well as luxury items. On the simplest level, a worker can 
utilize her labor to earn capital, which can then be used to purchase 
the various things needed to live in society. Additionally, large 
business enterprises, such as publicly held corporations,37 can 
generate capital from the sale of goods and services. This capital can 
be used to compensate shareholders with dividends,38 to expand the 
business geographically and to develop new products. Such 
enterprises can also use this capital to engage in research and 
development activities that can facilitate revenue-generating 
products.39 Therefore, a clear body of property law must exist to 
facilitate the creation, protection and transferability of private 
property.  Such law is fundamental to the growth and development of 
a capitalistic economic system.40 
 
activity in which it is most productivei.e., in which it can make the best use of its skills. 
As a result no one person carries out all the tasks in the production. . . . DAVID W. PEARCE, 
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 113 (4th ed. 1992). 
 36 See generally LARRY D. SODERQUIST, A.A. SOMMER, JR., PAT K. CHEW & LINDA O. 
SMIDDY, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 5 (4th ed. 1997) (noting 
surging demand for highly skilled workers). 
 37 See id. at 25-26 (publicly held corporation defined by the existence of public market 
for buying/selling shares). 
 38 See supra note 36, at 164 (shareholders have right to corporations profits). 
Dividends is the common term for distributions from a corporation to its  
shareholders. . . . FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 2.3.1, at 153 (2000). 
 39 See generally JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN & MAUREEN MCGUIRL, 
4 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 72.01[1], at 72-2 (2d ed. 2001) (creation of 
new ideas essential to society because it enables technological developments resulting in 
superior products at lower prices). 
 40 See generally Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve 
Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 193 (1991) (central tenet of our 
economic system is that technological innovation is necessary to maintain and improve our 
standard of living); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (Private property, including intellectual property, is 
essential to our way of life.). 
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The importance of freedom of speech and private property rights41 
provide the foundation upon which the United States economy is 
based. These rights and freedoms have contributed to the creation of 
a country that is a haven for many of the various peoples of the world 
seeking to escape economic, political or religious oppression and 
discrimination. The citizens of this country enjoy significant rights 
and freedoms that allow individualism to flourish.42 The result is a 
society that de-emphasizes class structure in favor of actual 
accomplishments with economic value.43 This country has produced 
an entrepreneurial-based society44 that has fueled an unrivaled 
economy.45 
Correspondingly, the standard of living in the United States is 
higher than in many other countries.46 The United States is a leader 
in the production of technology47 and its application to everyday 
endeavors such as health care and communications. Private 
 
 41 See generally  Maureen Straub Kordesh, I Will Build my House with Sticks: The 
Splintering of Property Interests under the Fifth Amendment may be Hazardous to Private 
Property, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 406, n.52 (1996) (protection of private property 
necessary to create incentive to make business investments). 
 42 Entrepreneurialism, individualism, and economic self-reliance are traditional 
American values. R.A. Katzman, The Attenuation of Antitrust, in THE BROOKINGS REVIEW 
23 (1984). 
 43 See generally Leroy D. Clark, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bells Thesis of the 
Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 23, 30 n.42 
(1995) (noting rejection of class structure in America). 
 44 See Janet Whitman, Level of Entrepreneurship Varies Sharply by Nation, Study of 
New Business Finds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2001, at B9C (U.S. major source of 
entrepreneurial activity). See generally id. (study shows societal dependence on social 
programs reduces individual innovation which limits entrepreneurial activity). 
 45 See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Institutions for International Economic 
Regulation: Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 J. INTL. L. 
BUS. 900, 910 (1997) (standard of living in U.S. related to economic success of business 
enterprises); Aimee M. Adler, Competition in Telephony: Perception or Reality? Current 
Barriers to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 J.L. & POLY 571, 584 (1999) (noting, in 
context of telecommunications industry, lack of competition can have negative effect on 
economy). See also MARK S. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLYLEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 16 (1962) (pro-competitive policies support free enterprise economic 
system and individual liberties). 
 46 See Presidential Proclamation 6013, The Bicentennial Anniversary of the First U.S. 
Patent and Copyright Laws, 54 FR 34125 (Aug. 1989) (noting U.S. standard of living has 
long been the highest in the world). 
 47 See id. (U.S. technology and innovation important factor in high U.S. standard of 
living). 
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enterprise has developed highly liquid capital markets, bringing 
together large amounts of private funds with budding companies that 
have developed products, and that are in need of capital to develop, 
produce, market and sell those products.48 Private enterprise has also 
developed reliable payment and delivery systems that allow almost 
instantaneous transfer of funds and rapid delivery of goods.49 
Although many things have contributed to the successful economy 
developed by this country, the rudimentary importance of the 
individual rights granted to citizens of this country should not be 
overlooked.50 Precisely those rights have contributed to the 
individualism that has allowed many Americans to pursue dreams 
and ideas with limited fear of government reprisal. Consequently, 
any curtailment of freedom of speech or private property rights 
should be carefully scrutinized.51 A single limitation may seem small 
and insignificant on its own; however, the long-term consequences of 
any restriction can be significant from a macro or long-term 
perspective. 
 
 
 48 Stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange and the NASDAQ, and commodity exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of 
Trade, provide highly efficient mechanisms for raising capital. During the last twenty years 
numerous new financial products including derivatives have increased the efficiency of 
financial markets. Additionally, modern computer technology has added new electronic 
markets that enable equity trading to occur both in cyberspace and on conventional 
exchanges. See Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1349 (1997) (U.S. capital markets highly efficient); James H. Freis, Jr., 
An Outsiders Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: A Guide to 
Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19 B.C. INTL & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 66 (1996) (N.Y. Stock Exchange most efficient capital market in world). 
 49 Such things work as a result of the highly effective infrastructures that exist in the 
U.S. See generally The Report of the Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting Americas Infrastructures, Oct. 1997 at 3, cited 
in Joginder S. Dhillon & Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information Operations and Domestic 
Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L. REV. 135, 136 
(2001). 
 50 See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 118, at 28 
(4th ed. 1988) (free market competition can be viewed as form of individual liberty). 
 51 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (property protection must represent careful balance because 
overprotecting property, including intellectual property, can be harmful just as 
underprotecting property can be harmful). 
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II. PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A. Background 
The current state of property law, as it applies to real property and 
tangible personal property, provides strong rights to owners. The law 
generally provides the private property owner with exclusive rights 
to decide how to use her property.52 Decisions to transfer the 
property by gift or sale are also within the exclusive domain of the 
property owner.53 Likewise, the property owner has a right to both 
exclude and grant access to her property.54  The importance attached 
to the protection of property is exemplified by the distinction 
between liability-based and property-based legal theories.55 
 
 52 Of course, no rights are absolute. Therefore, despite the strength of private property 
rights, exceptions exist. For example, the freedom to utilize real property can be limited by 
zoning law, land use statutes or regulations, or by designation of property as part of an 
historic district. Adjacent property owners can also bring private nuisance actions that may 
limit land use. Likewise, federal and state law limits the transfer of tangible personal 
property such as firearms and prescription drugs. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
51 Cal. 3d 120, 165-66, nn.6-11 (1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 
(1991). See also Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) 
(enjoining a business owner from continuing business on his property pursuant to nuisance 
action). 
 53 Some exceptions also exist with respect to this property right. The government, 
contrary to a property owners wishes, can cause a conveyance of property from a private 
individual to the government pursuant to the right of eminent domain. See NORMAN 
REDLICH, ET AL, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.03[3], at 199 (2d ed. 1999). 
Additionally, a court can order the sale of concurrently owned property in response to a 
partition action, brought by one concurrent owner, pursuant to a remedy called partition-by-
sale; see, e.g., Frank v. Frank, 1992 WL 83533 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992). See generally 
STOEBUCK &  WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.13, at 221-24 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 
partition actions). 
 54 Exceptions to this right also exist.  For example, police officers, pursuant to a valid 
search warrant, can lawfully enter private property despite the owners objection, in pursuit 
of a criminal and pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, 
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 1.03[B][2], at 5 (2000). Additionally, anti-discrimination 
laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or 
national origin in the sale or rental of housing. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 
(1994) (explaining purpose of the Fair Housing Act). 
 55 See Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of 
Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 196-98 (1998) (discussing liability- and 
property-based rules); see generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
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Liability-based theories, which underlie much of both contract and 
tort law, typically require an economic injury that can be quantified 
with some degree of predictability before a legal cause of action or 
theory can be successfully pursued.56 In contrast, a property-based 
legal theory allows legal recourse even in the absence of an 
economic injury. The focus of such a theory is on protection of a 
particular property right such as the right to exclude unwanted parties 
from your real property.57 
The underlying policy reasons for the protection of real property 
and tangible personal property apply with equal vigor to certain types 
of intellectual property.58 
 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972) (discussing property and liability rules). 
 56 For example, in a successful breach of contract action evidence of economic injury 
flowing directly from the contract breach is usually demonstrated. If there is no showing of 
economic injury the result is an award of only nominal damages that is usually either six 
cents or a dollar. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-2, at 558-
89 (3d ed. 1987). Likewise, in a tort action based on a negligence theory an injury causally 
related to the negligent act is a necessary element of the prima facie case. See W. PAGE 
KEETON, ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
 57 A trespass action is a property-based theory.  An unwanted invasion of real property 
is actionable by the property owner without regard to whether any quantifiable injury 
flowed from the invasion. The mere violation of the owners right to decide whom to 
exclude from her property is the basis of the action. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (noting that one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property [is] the right to exclude others.) Typically, in 
the absence of an economic injury a successful trespass action will lead to an award of 
nominal damages, and, if appropriate, injunctive relief barring any future trespasses. See 
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, § 7.1, at 411 (explaining that intentional entry onto 
anothers property without permission is wrongful and therefore a trespass). See also James 
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(economic damages not required to succeed in trademark infringement action.); Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (concluding award of $100,000 in 
punitive damages appropriate for intentional trespass despite lack of economic damages).  
This suggests that trademarks are viewed as property protected by property-based rules. The 
federal trademark law also provides broad remedies, including injunctive relief, which is 
consistent with a property-based rule. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117, 1118; College Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (noting trademarks are property). 
 58 See generally POSNER, supra note 34, § 3.3, at 38 (economists apply same rationale 
for protection of tangible property to protection of intellectual property). 
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B. Intellectual Property as Private Property 
Assets utilized by both individuals and businesses include 
intangible information as well as tangible assets and real property.59 
Such intangible information, generally referred to as intellectual 
property, has economic value in the marketplace in the same way 
that tangible assets and real property have economic value.60 The 
economic value placed on intellectual property is evidenced by the 
increasing use of such property to generate revenue.61  Intellectual 
property is used as security for borrowed capital;62 a substantial 
amount of investment dollars flowing into enterprises is based on 
companies ownership of intellectual property; and an increasing 
amount of money is spent in order to obtain patent protection for a 
corporations intellectual property.63 
 
 59 Intellectual property is typically classified as intangible personal property in contrast 
to real property and tangible personal property. See SPRANKLING, supra note 54, § 
1.04[C][2], at 9. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (finding that patents are treated as personal 
property); College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (stating that trademarks are property). 
 60 The value of intellectual property accounts for two-thirds of the market valuation of 
U.S. corporations. See Jenna Greene, Patent Office at Center Stage, THE NATL L.J., Jan. 15, 
2001, at B8. Major assets of many companies today consist of intellectual property.  See 
Lars S. Smith, Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA 549 
(2000) ([M]ajor assets of many corporations exist in the form of patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets . . .); see also Margaret Cronin Fisk, Patent Victories Reflect 
2000 Trend, THE NATL L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at A1 (jury awards increased substantially 
during 2000, but the largest increase occurred in intellectual property cases). See generally 
Gardiner Harris, Judge Permits Cheap Knockoff of Bristol Drug, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 
2001, at B1 (stating that patents can significantly effect profits); Joseph A. Slobodzian, 
Patent Challenges Are Key to Generics, THE NATL L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at B10 (discussing 
how successful suit by generic drug maker challenging Eli Lilly & Co. patent on Prozac 
caused generic drug maker stock to rise 68% with corresponding 30% decline in Eli Lilly & 
Co. stock). 
 61 See Hayden R. Brainard, Survey and Study of Technology Development and Transfer 
Needs in New York, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 433-34 (1999) (businesses and 
universities view intellectual property as potential revenue source). 
 62 See Shawn K. Baldwin, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: A 
Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 
1730 (1995) (a company or individual must often offer intellectual property as security in 
order to obtain financing); see also Aimee A. Watterberg, Perfecting a Security Interest in 
Computer Software Copyrights: Getting it Right, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
855, 858 (1997) (intellectual property has been used as collateral to raise money in the past 
by famous inventors such as Thomas Edison). 
 63 See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL 
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Recognition of the need for protection of intellectual property is 
not new.64 The Constitution grants to Congress the power [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.65 This enabling language of 
the Constitution is the basis of the federal patent and copyright 
laws.66 Although these laws have existed for a long time, recently 
there seems to be increased public awareness of this body of law.67  
One reason may be the increased commercial importance of 
intellectual property for business enterprises.68 As a result, the 
 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 138 (2000) (noting the significant increase in the number of 
patents being obtained); Under Secretary Dickinsons Address to the ABA Section of 
Intellectual Property Law, Summer Conference Boston, Massachusetts, Section of 
Intellectual Property Law, (June 23, 2000), 1 USPTO TODAY 49, 54-55, June-July 2000, at 
13 (noting that Patent & Trademark Office workload up almost 70% since start of Clinton-
Gore presidential administration due to large increase in invention and innovation).  Many 
Internet companies have obtained patents on their new methods of doing business; See, e.g., 
U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) entitled Method and system for placing a 
purchase order via a communications network (patent owned by Amazon.com); U.S. Patent 
No. 6,102,406 (issued Aug. 15, 2000) entitled Internet-based advertising scheme 
employing scavenger hunt metaphor. Additionally, traditional businesses continue to rely 
on patent protection to provide a marketplace advantage. For example, IBM was awarded 
2,886 U.S. patents in 2000.  See INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, Jan. 11, 2001, 8A, at 2; in 
1993, Texas Instruments earned over $500 million from licensing patented technology.  See 
TURNER, supra note 55, at 200 n.84. Some enterprises are even using patent licensing as a 
source of revenue in lieu of actually making and selling the patented invention. See 
generally Antonio Regalado, Tiny Company Wields Patents Against Giants, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 9, 2001, at B1. 
 64 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1-13 (2d ed. 1997) (brief overview 
of history of patent law); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED 
STATE DOCTRINES 219-21, 552-53 (4th ed. 1997) (giving a brief overview of history of 
trademark and copyright law). Trade secret law used as early as the 1300s. See F.D. Prager, 
The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 106, 120-21 
(1952). See generally F.D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 
J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 711 (1944). 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 66 See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
GUIDEBOOK § I, at 1-8 (1992) (finding that this Constitutional clause, often called patent-
copyright clause, gives Congress power to enact patent and copyright laws). 
 67 The first known patent system existed in Venice in the mid-fifteenth century. The 
first federal patent law and copyright law were enacted in the U.S. in 1790. See GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 64, at 552. 
 68 See generally Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting importance of strong intellectual property laws to protect business 
investment and economy). 
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number of enterprises seeking and relying on patent and copyright 
protection has increased.69  Another reason for this heightened 
awareness is the medias insatiable quest for stories about enterprises 
conducting business on the Internet.70  Because some companies may 
even have intellectual property whose value dwarfs the value of their 
physical assets,71 media coverage of such intellectual property is 
inevitable.72 Infringement suits brought by patent owners are also 
more likely in light of the judicially recognized strength of patent 
law.73  Regardless of the cause, the result has been an increase in 
public knowledge.74 
Business enterprises and individuals are doing the same things 
with intellectual property as they have always done, and continue to 
 
 69 This increased reliance on intellectual property has led Congress to grant increased 
protection for such property under the criminal law. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1832 (criminal 
sanctions for theft of trade secret); id. § 2320 (providing criminal sanctions for trademark 
counterfeiting); id. § 2319 (criminal infringement of copyright). The increased focus on the 
need to protect intellectual property is also the result of increased counterfeiting of 
legitimate consumer goods. It is estimated that sales of counterfeit goods, often with fake 
trademarks, reached $2 billion annually last year. See Can You Spot the Fake?, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 16, 2001, at W1. 
 70 Internet commerce currently generates over three hundred billion dollars in annual 
revenue. See Sandra Szczerbicki, Comment, The Shakedown on State Street, 79 OR. L. REV. 
253, 254 (2000). Internet commerce is expected to grow to over one trillion dollars by 2002. 
Id. at 254 n.6. 
 71 See Lee G. Meyer, Intellectual Property in Todays Financing Market, 2000 ABI 
JNL. LEXIS 34, *20 (2000) (intellectual property often most valuable asset of modern 
enterprise). 
 72 Interestingly, many new start-up enterprisesespecially Internet companieshave 
few assets other than intellectual property. Additionally, established old-line businesses 
often have extensive intellectual property portfolios. Such portfolios can contribute to the 
under valuation of a publicly traded companys shares because under generally accepted 
accounting principles patents will typically be listed on a companys balance sheet at 
historical cost, thus misstating the true market value of a patent. See Mohammad S. 
Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145, 149 
(1998). 
 73 Prior to 1982, U.S. Courts of Appeals applied different standards in evaluating 
patents. In 1982, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which 
was given exclusivity over patent appeals. This court has unified and strengthened patent 
standards. Consequently, a patent is more likely to be found valid today; obtaining 
injunctive relief against infringement is now easier and monetary damages for infringement 
have increased substantially. See MERGES, supra note 64, at 383. 
 74 See Lemley, supra note 63. 
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do, with real property and tangible personal property.75 All types of 
private property are typically used to generate revenue.76 The 
reliance on intellectual property to obtain an advantageous position 
in a competitive marketplace is analogous to a real estate investor 
who acquires a key parcel of real estate needed to complete a large 
commercial development. The types of assets used by an enterprise 
do not alter the underlying goal of relying on such assets to 
maximize revenue generation. Hence, the reliance on intellectual 
property to obtain an advantageous marketplace position merely 
represents a shift to increased reliance on a different type of asset and 
is not a new phenomenon.77 
The ability of a commercial enterprise to rely on intellectual 
property improves marketplace efficiency.78 This is especially true 
when coupled with the electronic interconnection of the world via the 
Internet.79  Traditional bricks and mortar entities have a natural 
advantage over new competitors due to the financial barriers to entry. 
A competitor must have sufficient capital to plan and construct a 
physical enterprise. Additionally, she must have capital to engage in 
the expensive task of marketing and advertising her enterprise.80 
 
 75 Despite the current media focus on intellectual property, business reliance on such 
property is not new. Business enterprises have relied on patented technology since the first 
United States patent law was enacted by Congress in 1790. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64. 
 76 See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, Bombshell Photos for EBay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at 
B1 (outtake photos from photo shoot of Marilyn Monroe and her signed model release form 
to be auctioned on-line); Nathan Koppel, Productize This! Recycling Briefs and Memos for 
Resale on the Web May Enrich a Vendor or Two, but Does it Make Sense for Law Firms?, 
THE AM. LAWYER, Feb. 5, 2001, at 1 (noting that some firms are selling intellectual property 
of law firms in form of old briefs, memos, etc.). 
 77 See Meyer, supra note 71 (historically value of business based on land ownership; 
during industrial revolution value of business based on capital goods; today, intellectual 
property increasingly important with regard to value of business). Both the U.S. Justice 
Department Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission treat intellectual property 
rights in the same manner as they treat other property rights pursuant to federal antitrust 
laws. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 39, § 1.04 [f], at 1-13 to 1-14. 
 78 In some cases, ownership of intellectual property such as patents can help level the 
playing field between large and small enterprises. See Antonio Regalado, Tiny Company 
Wields Patents Against Giants, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at B1. See generally MARGRETH 
BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYCASES AND MATERIAL 2 (1995) (facilitating 
marketplace competition is main purpose of intellectual property law). 
 79 See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 80 See generally AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 50, ¶ 115, at 22 (capital requirements 
can be barrier to market entry). 
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Such capital investment entails a level of risk. If the ratio of risk to 
investment is too high in a particular market sector, an enterprise 
may choose to shift its capital to a different arena.81  In contrast, an 
enterprise can create a virtual presence in cyberspace with limited 
resources.82 Once created, the Internet allows over 300 million 
people throughout the world to access your cyber-enterprise.83  
Additionally, most users navigate the Internet via search engines that 
scour cyberspace looking for specific words or phrases.84 As a result, 
despite a lack of marketing, many potential customers will find the 
cyber-business with the help of a search engine. The minimal 
economic barriers to entry into the cyber-business world attract new 
competitors.85 Furthermore, the shift over the last century from a 
local to a global economy has made people more accustomed to 
doing business via the Internet. This is a positive result for a 
capitalistic economic system because an increased number of 
competitors coupled with more consumers enable the marketplace to 
act more efficiently.86 Increased competition encourages enterprises 
 
 81 See generally GARDINER C. MEANS, PRICING POWER & THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176-77 
(1976) (capital moves to activities which provide highest rate of return). 
 82 A business enterprise can create a place on the Internet for a very small investment. A 
domain name (essentially an Internet address) can be obtained for a small fee. An Internet 
Service Provider can host the domain name for a modest monthly fee which may include 
processing on-line credit card orders. Finally, a web page can be created by the business 
owner utilizing inexpensive off-the-shelf software; alternatively, she can hire an 
independent web designer to create the web page. Essentially, for a few thousand dollars, an 
independent designer can create a basic web page.  Consequently, a business can be created 
on the Internet that can reach hundreds of millions of people throughout the world for a 
relatively small fee.  Of course, there is no limit on the amount of money that can be spent 
on designing a web page. Some companies spend millions of dollars creating their web 
pages. See Szczerbicki, supra note 70, at 253, 280. 
 83 See Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream 
Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 63 (2000).  It is estimated that the number 
of Internet users could reach one billion within the next two years. Id. at 70. 
 84 For example, Yahoo, Altavista, Webcrawler, Excite!, Lycos, Search.com and Ask 
Jeeves are some of the search engines available on the Internet. See ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d  
at 484. Some of these search engine companies engage in their own substantial marketing 
and advertising efforts which encourages and increases consumer use of their search engine. 
This ultimately benefits the small cyber-business with limited funds for marketing and 
advertising since the increased use of search engines increases their exposure and thus the 
likelihood they will be seen by potential customers. 
 85 See id. at 486 (noting the explosive growth of Internet commerce due to low entry 
barriers coupled with global market). 
 86 Although theoretically true, this broad statement must be qualified. Under certain 
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to strive for efficiency in order to maximize net profit revenue while 
maintaining the lowest prices possible. Additionally, this encourages 
innovation both to reduce costs and to enable a competitor to 
differentiate itself in the marketplace.87 
 
 
conditions, economies of scale allow a larger enterprise to have greater efficiency than a 
smaller enterprise. Consequently, some markets may be more efficient if a small number of 
large producers exist in lieu of a highly fragmented market comprised of numerous small 
enterprises. On the other hand, a mix of large and small enterprises may be the most 
efficient in some markets. Ultimately, the mix of enterprises that results in the most efficient 
market depends upon many factors.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW § 1.1, at 13-14, § 1.4, at 24-31 (1985); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, III, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 
2.04, at 25-26 (3d ed. 1998). For example, large enterprises usually can acquire capital at 
lower costs than smaller enterprises. This would give a large enterprise a significant 
advantage in a highly capital-intensive business. Conversely, in some markets, such as 
consumer products, small entities can effectively compete against larger well-known 
enterprises by free-riding on the well-known status of the large enterprise. For example, 
generic drugs and other off-brand products often use comparative wording on their packages 
to compete with well-known products produced by large enterprises. Such products are also 
often displayed adjacent to well-known products that they compete against. Some 
supermarkets charge the makers of well-known brands slotting fees to insure choice shelf 
space for their products in order to reduce the effects of free-riders. The free-riders have 
neither the research and development costs nor the extensive advertising costs that the well-
known products have. Consequently, they may have a significant cost advantage over the 
larger enterprise even if the larger enterprise is more efficiently operated. See Gen. 
Leaseways, Inc. v. Natl Truck Leasing Assn, 744 F.2d 588, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 87 In light of the fact that intellectual property is used for the same commercial goals as 
real property and tangible personal property, one might question why separate bodies of law 
exist to protect intellectual property.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101332; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1376; 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (West 1990) (adopted by majority of 
jurisdictions). Arguably, such separate bodies of law do not exist to provide additional 
protection to intellectual property. Rather they exist to address the inadequacies that arise 
from the application of conventional common law property protection to intellectual 
property because of the unique characteristics of intellectual property. The common law has 
certain underlying goals; namely, to provide a property owner with the exclusive right to 
possess, use and transfer her property. Unlike real property and tangible personal property, 
intellectual property can be possessed and used simultaneously by multiple parties or 
entities. Additionally, the amorphous nature of intellectual property makes it difficult to 
determine who created the property and to regulate property transfers. 
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III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:       
A CONFLICT? 
Intellectual property comprises information or ideas which 
typically generate market value.88  Under the traditional property 
doctrine as applied to intellectual property, the owner is entitled to 
control any unauthorized use of such property.89 Typically, 
 
 88 An enterprise can use intellectual property in the form of inventions, trade secrets, or 
technological know-how to create products that can be sold in the marketplace. Sometimes 
such intellectual property can provide economic advantages that enhance the competitive 
position of the property owner. Intellectual property can also be sold or licensed to others 
who use it to create products for the marketplace. Additionally, venture capital firms can 
bring together inventors who often lack adequate capital to develop and market the 
invention, with investors who are seeking to make equity investments in new business 
enterprises in the hopes of achieving above market returns. 
 89 Typically, the recognition of real or personal property rights allows the property 
owner to control possession and use of her property. Further, she has the right to transfer or 
refuse to transfer her property or any rights in her property. See Moore, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 
176  (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that property rights include right to possession and use 
of property, right to exclude others from property and right to transfer property). The owners 
of intellectual property typically have the same rights with regard to their intellectual 
property. For example, patent law provides that a patent owner has the exclusive right, 
during the patent term, to prohibit others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). Additionally, such patent rights have 
been judicially interpreted to allow the patent owner to suppress the invention; to grant 
licenses limited in time or in geographic area; or to limit only certain rights such as the right 
to sell or use the invention. See Ernest S. Meyers & Seymour D. Lewis, The Patent 
Franchise and the Antitrust Law, 30 GEO. L.J. 117, 120 (1941); see also Special Equip. v. 
Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945) (holding that a patent owner is not required to use or 
license patent). Granting such rights to intellectual property owners supports the idea that 
intellectual property rights are property rights. The patent law exclusively recognizes this 
when it states patents shall have the attributes of personal property. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 
(1994). But see Special Equip., 324 U.S. at 381-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
law should not allow patent owners to suppress patented invention because it is not merely 
another type of private property). 
  Nevertheless, it is the ability to exclusively control intellectual property that is often 
the basis for criticism of intellectual property laws. Critics argue that granting exclusive 
rights to control intellectual property, pursuant to patent or copyright law, for example, 
amounts to a monopoly on information. However, this view represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of monopolies. Typically, the law does not find monopolies 
objectionable; a company that provides a superior product may exercise a monopoly over its 
production and sale.  See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945).  Likewise, the Sherman Act does not prohibit the existence of a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (1944).  In contrast, it forbids monopolizing, which is generally defined as: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power.  See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
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injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy; it preserves the ability of 
the property owner to maintain control over her property. Also, like 
land, intellectual property is often unique,90 making it difficult to 
quantify economic damages resulting from unauthorized use.91 
Hence, injunctive relief may be an appropriate remedy to protect 
intellectual property just as it protects real property.92 
The goal of injunctive relief is to restrict dissemination of 
intellectual property.  However, intellectual property comprises 
information and ideas; any restriction on dissemination may be in 
conflict with the underlying thrust of the First Amendment, which 
seeks  to  prohibit  restrictions  on  speech.  This raises a fundamental  
 
(1966).  Consequently, the exclusive rights granted to intellectual property owners are 
analogous to the exclusive rights granted to owners of tangible property. In both cases, it is 
the conduct with regard to how the property is used, rather than the mere ownership of the 
property that can be potentially anti-competitive. Additionally, the objectionable conduct of 
monopolizing requires the existence of monopoly power. Typically, this is defined as the 
ability to control price or restrict competition.  United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & 
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).  The mere ownership of a patent or other intellectual 
property rights does not automatically grant market power. The existence of competing or 
analogous products provides a check on market power. See generally SULLIVAN & 
HARRISON, III, supra note 86, § 2.03, at 21 (stating that a monopoly exists when there is 
one seller of a good for which there is an absence of acceptable substitutes).  For example, 
if the price of a patented product is too high, consumers will avoid the product in favor of 
less costly alternative products. Additionally, if few alternative products are available, the 
existence of the patented product will facilitate competition in an effort to find ways to 
invent around the patented product. See PETER D. ROSENBERG, 3 PATENT LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS § 16.05, at 16-89 (2d ed. 2000), § 16.05[4], at 16-09 to 16-121 (discussion 
of interaction of patent rights and section 2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits 
monopolizing); see also U.S. v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) 
(though often so characterized, a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly); 35 
U.S.C. § 271(d) (stating that unlawful patent misuse can only occur if patent owner has 
market power). 
 90 Typically, things that are novel and original are unique. Patents, one type of 
intellectual property, require patentable subject matter to be both novel and original. See 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (novelty requirement) & 102(f) (originality requirement) (1994). 
Likewise, copyrightable subject matter must be original. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). 
 91 See, e.g., GOLLIN, supra note 40, at 200-01 (damages for trade secret 
misappropriation difficult to establish). 
 92 Although only monetary damages, rather than injunctive relief, is the typical remedy 
for breach of contract, injunctive relief in the form of specific performance is the usual 
remedy for breach of a contract for the sale of real estate.  The classic justification for this is 
that land is unique. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 16-2, at 662-63. 
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conflict based on the question of whether intellectual property should 
be treated as property or as speech.93 
This question cannot be resolved simply by attempting to ascertain 
whether intellectual property is in fact within the domain of property 
as that term is generally understood.94  Case law has held that 
intellectual property is within the traditional definition of property in 
certain contexts.95  Nevertheless, concluding that something is 
property does not end the analysis. Likewise, concluding that speech 
is involved does not automatically trigger the full weight of the First 
Amendment freedom of speech guarantees. Instead, a balance must 
be struck between protecting private property and free speech rights 
when both interests are simultaneously involved.96 
 
 93 In Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1999), Judge 
Edmunds stated that the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining an 
unauthorized third party from releasing alleged trade secrets on the Internet created a clash 
between our commitment to the freedom of speech and the press, and our dedication to the 
protection of commercial innovation and intellectual property. 
 94 Property is more than the physical thingit involves the group of rights inherent in 
a citizens relation to the physical thing. Traditionally, that group of rights has included the 
rights to possess, use, and dispose of property. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commn 
of Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216 N.W. 2d 651, 661 (Minn. 1974).  See generally 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, Ch. 1, Introduction, at 3 (1936) (discussing how 
property law provides a framework and rules regarding the legal relationship between 
persons and things). 
 95 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade 
secrets constitute a property right under Fifth Amendment Takings clause); Consolidated 
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (A patent for an invention is as much 
property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation and is surrounded and 
protected by the same sanctions.); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (noting beyond reasonable debate that patents are property). See generally 
Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929) (stating that 
property interests can exist in any right and interest which a person can use and transfer, and 
which has economic value). See also Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics 
of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 61-62 (1992) (arguing property under the Fifth 
Amendment should be broadly construed to cover all property, including intellectual 
property). 
 96 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (noting that courts balance public interest in speech restriction against public interest 
in type of speech involved when evaluating the issue of constitutionality). In Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 
1979), the Court stated that [t]he First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally 
recognized rights of intellectual property. The Court also stated that [t]he judgment of the 
Constitution is that free expression is enriched by protecting the creations of authors from 
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Any mature legal system recognizes that rights, including property 
or free speech rights, cannot be absolute.97 Situations always exist, 
where a particular right, no matter how important, must give way to a 
competing concern.98  In fact, almost all legal rules represent a 
balance of several competing underlying policies.99  In the case of 
freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment, some 
academics and judicial opinions have opined that such rights should 
remain unfettered.100  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected 
 
exploitation by others. . . . Id. at 1187. 
 97 Additionally, it is useful to note that the classification of something as property or 
as speech is a policy-based determination. See Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 
1111 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that body tissue constitutes property). However, not 
everything that exhibits the traditional aspects of property is deemed property by the law. 
See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (holding that body tissues not property because of potential 
negative effects on medical research); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 
(1957) (stating that obscenity is not protected by First Amendment).  See generally Deborah 
Meigs Bibbins, The Goal of Imperfection: Babbitt v. Sweet Home and the Necessity of 
Imperfect Property Rights, 29 CONN. L. REV. 919 (1997) (noting that historically, property 
rights have not been exclusive or absolute). 
 98 See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 165-66, nn.6-11.  For example, private property rights are 
limited pursuant to nuisance law which can prohibit a property owner from engaging in 
legal behavior on her property when such activity has an unreasonable effect on adjoining 
land or on the public in general. Additionally, zoning laws routinely provide limits on the 
use of property. See supra note 52. 
 99 See, e.g., Faun M. Phillipson, Fairness of Contract vs. Freedom of Contract: The 
Problematic Nature of Contractual Obligation in Premarital Agreements, 5 CARDOZO 
WOMENS L.J. 79, 82-83 (1998) (tension between the competing policies of freedom of 
contract and the rules implemented to insure fair dealing and procedural fairness in creating 
agreements is the most problematic issue surrounding the enforceability of premarital 
agreements); Brandon Edward Mary, James v. Illinois  The Impeachment Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Here Today . . ., 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 681, 687 n.53 (1991) (underlying 
policies of exclusionary rule in evidence law must be balanced against competing policies); 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETSA PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 34-35 (1994) (noting 
that the goal of recognizing intellectual property is based on furthering public dissemination 
of knowledge, but accomplishment of that goal requires granting property rights to 
innovations which inherently restrict dissemination).  See also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 
1:3, at 1-7 (stating that the U.S. economic system is best explained as regulated competition 
representing compromise between socialism and laissez faire system); Zippo Manufacturing 
Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (stating that unfair 
competition law is based on several competing policies including preventing consumer 
confusion, promoting competition and preventing misappropriation of benefits created by 
one party). 
 100 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); Hugo L. 
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867, 874 (1960). Similar arguments about 
the absolute nature of private property rights have been advanced. Additionally, the 
proponents of such absolute property rights have succeeded in passing legislation designed 
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this absolutist view and recognized speech restrictions in appropriate 
situations.101  Typically, these restrictions are viewed as exceptions, 
limited to tightly defined categories.  Generally, prior restraints102 
have been found so abhorrent to freedom of speech that they are 
rarely allowed.103  If the speech involved is harmful, for example, 
because it is libelous, the remedy is an action for damages after the 
fact rather than restricting dissemination of the speech.104 
Despite the general judicial dislike for prior restraints, in the area 
of intellectual property law, preliminary relief, in the form of 
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, is often 
granted to protect intellectual property.105  In some cases, the owner 
of the intellectual property may even obtain preliminary relief ex 
 
to strengthen private property rights in real property. See Bibbins, supra note 97, at 925. 
This absolutist view of property rights is one of the causes of the dispute between 
environmentalists and private real property owners. See id. at 923. 
 101 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (First Amendment does 
not provide absolute freedom of speech rights). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWPRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2, at 750 (1997). See also Knights 
of Ku Klux Klan, 807 F. Supp. at 1433 (stating that rather than treating First Amendment 
rights as absolute, Supreme Court has subordinated such rights to other societal interests in 
some situations); Dunagin, 489 F. Supp. at 769 (finding that freedom of speech is not 
absolute). Speech in the workplace environment can sometimes amount to illegal sexual 
harassment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been aware of the need to balance free 
speech rights with an employees right to a workplace free of sexual harassment. See 
generally Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), rehearing denied, 
121 S. Ct. 2264, and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1988). 
 102 See SHAUER, supra note 7, at 148-85. 
 103 Id. at 131-35 (prior restraints are generally impermissible in the U.S. absent the 
satisfaction of an almost insurmountable burden). But see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 
25, at 732 (stating that obscenity is one of the few areas where prior restraints are allowed). 
 104 See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990); Kisser v. 
Coalition for Religious Freedom, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3906, at *3  (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 105 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 158-59 (stating courts more likely to grant  
preliminary injunction in copyright cases than in other cases).  Additionally, preliminary 
relief is commonly used in trade secret misappropriation cases. See id. at 229. Injunctions 
are statutorily recognized remedies for protecting intellectual property. See UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 2 (1985), 14 U.L.A. 433, 449 (1990) (injunctions available to remedy trade 
secret misappropriation); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (injunctions available under Lanham Act 
to protect trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (injunctions available to protect rights under 
copyright law); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (injunctions available to protect rights under patent 
law); 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (federal government can obtain injunctive relief under Economic 
Espionage Act to protect trade secrets). 
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parte.106  It has been asserted, although rarely successfully, that such 
preliminary relief is a prior restraint on speech when a third party is 
barred from publicly disclosing intellectual property.107 
IV. PRELIMINARY RELIEF IN JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Background 
The United States legal system is a fault-based system. Although 
there are exceptions to this rule,108 typically liability and punishment 
result from a final adjudication that a legally established standard of 
conduct has been violated.109  Nevertheless, the law is responsive to 
the reality of the marketplace. Therefore, this fault-based theory may 
be inappropriate in certain contexts.110  This notion is evidenced by 
widespread acceptance of preliminary relief in appropriate cases.111  
Issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions 
occur prior to a courts final determination of the facts and 
adjudication of the relevant law in a dispute.112  However, in certain 
situations such preliminary relief can preserve the status quo until the 
final decision by the court.113  Issuance of such relief has the effect of 
 
 106 See MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 14.01[2], at 14-25 (noting that in appropriate cases an 
ex parte temporary restraining order may be obtained in a trade secret action even if it is 
possible to provide notice to the defendant). 
 107 See Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 746; see also supra note 19. 
 108 Common law vicarious liability is not based on fault, but rather on a policy of 
allocating risk of loss from employee to employer as a cost of doing business. See Reed v. 
House of Decor, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La. 1985).  See also KEETON, ET AL, supra 
note 56, § 70, at 499-501.  Under workers compensation statutes in effect in all states, 
[t]he employer is charged with injuries arising out of his business, without regard to any 
question of his negligence, or that of the injured employee. He is liable for injuries caused 
by pure unavoidable accident, or by the negligence of the worker. Id. § 80 at 573. 
 109 See, e.g., KEETON, ET AL, supra note 56 (tort liability arises from breach of duty 
imposed upon individuals by law). 
 110 See, e.g., Reed, 468 So. 2d 1159. 
 111 See infra note 368 for test that must be satisfied to obtain a preliminary injunction. 
 112 See Am. Hosp. Assn v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1330 (7th Cir. 1980) (purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final hearing on the merits.). 
 113 See CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
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prohibiting actions that may or may not be in violation of the law.114  
The determination of whether the actions enjoined by the preliminary 
relief are in fact legal is unknown until the courts final decision. 
Issuance of a preliminary injunction is typically based on a judicial 
belief in the likelihood that one party will prevail.115  Nevertheless, 
the correctness of that assumption must await a determination 
following a complete adjudication of the controversy. Hence, a party 
in a judicial dispute may be enjoined from engaging in lawful 
conduct during the trial if ultimately the court finds the conduct at 
issue is not violative of the law, and therefore dissolves the 
preliminary relief at the conclusion of the trial.116 
Despite the fact that preliminary relief may prohibit legal conduct 
such relief is tolerated to avoid the irreparable injury that might 
occur during the course of a legal determination if the status quo is 
not preserved.117  This problem is exacerbated by the glacial speed at 
which courts often operate. In some cases, absent the availability of 
preliminary relief, the time it takes a court to render a decision may 
result in significant harm to a party in a dispute such that no 
available remedy at the end of the trial will fully compensate the 
injured party. 
Arguably, declaratory judgment actions118 serve a similar function. 
Here,  a  court  can  render  a decision before action resulting in harm  
 
 114 See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn on Human Relations et al., 
413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) (The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will 
be suppressed . . . before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First 
Amendment.). 
 115 See Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (likelihood of 
success threshold issue with regard to granting preliminary relief). 
 116 See generally Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 174 (preliminary relief may enjoin 
a party from engaging in lawful speech prior to an action on the merits determining that the 
speech is lawful). 
 117 See Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63 Misc. 2d 268, 271, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579, 584 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (preliminary injunction used to preserve status quo to avoid irreparable 
injury prior to final judgment). 
 118 In re Dewar, 548 P.2d 149, 153-54 (Mont. 1976) (finding declaratory judgment 
liquidates the uncertainties and controversies which might result in future litigation by 
defining the rights and duties of the parties.) 
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has occurred; reaching a determination before significant injury 
results is economically efficient.119 
The consequences caused by the time delay in judicial evaluation 
of conduct may be unacceptable if the conduct is ultimately adjudged 
unlawful.  Prevention of such consequences is simply viewed, in 
certain circumstances, as outweighing the potential short-term 
curtailment of lawful conduct.  Therefore, in appropriate cases, 
preliminary relief is a permissible remedy. 
B. The First Amendment as a Limitation on Preliminary Relief 
In light of the judicial acceptance of preliminary relief, should a 
different result prevail when the conduct being judicially reviewed is 
speech?  When speech is involved an additional policy must be 
added to the equation.  In addition to balancing potential short term 
curtailment of lawful conduct with the long term consequences of 
irreparable injury, the court must consider the potential negative 
effect of a speech restriction.  The First Amendment guarantee of 
free speech is a fundamental right with substantial importance.120 
Consequently, courts generally do not allow preliminary relief that 
restricts free speech.121  Any short-term restriction of free speech that 
might ultimately be adjudicated constitutionally protected speech is 
unacceptable to a court.  Hence, an injunction against speech must 
await a judicial determination that the speech in constitutionally 
 
 119 This same practical marketplace logic explains the reason why courts issue 
permanent injunctions after a full adjudication based only on a likelihood of confusion. In 
trademark infringement actions, a plaintiff need only prove a likelihood of consumer 
confusion to prevail. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994); see also Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago 
Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1959). Likewise, certain antitrust actions allow 
an injunction against future conduct based only on a likelihood of an anticompetitive effect 
on the marketplace.  See Clayton Act § 7 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18) (1994) (prohibiting 
mergers if the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly) (emphasis added). 
 120 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 121 See Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (holding that prior 
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement 
on First Amendment rights.); Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91, 96 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that prior restraint of defamation is impermissible).  See 
generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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unprotected; as a result, preliminary relief against speech is rarely 
allowed.  This balancing of interests in favor of speech is generally 
expressed as the judicial doctrine of prior restraint.122 
The application of the prior restraint doctrine in the context of 
impending disclosure of intellectual property must be evaluated by 
balancing the underlying policies at issue.  Typically, the fear of 
restricting constitutionally protected speech has led courts to deny 
preliminary relief for speech under the prior restraint doctrine.123  
Whether this doctrine should apply to use or disclosure of intellectual 
property depends upon whether any countervailing policy underlying 
or related to intellectual property outweighs the First Amendment 
interest protected by the prior restraint doctrine. 
In support of this analytical approach, it should be noted that even 
the Supreme Court has indicated that First Amendment rights are not 
absolute.124  Despite the importance of First Amendment freedom of 
speech guarantees, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
they provide the citizenry with an unlimited license to talk.125  
Rather, certain forms of speech are outside the domain of 
Constitutional protection.126  For example, the First Amendment does 
not protect obscenity, 127 fighting words 128 or incitement of illegal 
activity.129  Protected speech may fall outside the scope of the First 
Amendment when it is uttered in certain contexts.130  Finally, 
 
 122 See generally Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 169-78. 
 123 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 
(1973) (The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, 
either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate 
determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.). 
 124 See Bibbins, supra note 97, at 925. 
 125 See Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49-50. 
 126 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 11.3, at 800-01. 
 127 See Roth, 354 U.S. 481. 
 128 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 129 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 11.3.2, at 802. 
 130 See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1999) (remedial 
injunction prohibiting the continued use of racial epithets in the workplace does not violate 
the right to freedom of speech if there has been a judicial determination that the use of such 
epithets will contribute to the continuation of a hostile or abusive work environment and 
therefore will constitute employment discrimination). But see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377 
(holding that criminal hate speech statute is unconstitutional under First Amendment). 
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governmental regulatory schemes that incidentally regulate the time, 
place and manner of public expression in order to serve some 
legitimate governmental purpose are permissible, provided the 
schemes do not regulate the content of speech.131 
Therefore, it should be clear that, due to competing policies, free 
speech rights may be limited.132  This limitation underlies the Courts 
differential treatment of commercial speech in contrast to other types 
of speech.133  The question that remains is how to balance the 
underlying reasons for the protection of intellectual property against 
the underlying policies for protecting freedom of speech. 
This suggested balancing is premised on the belief that law is not 
decided in a vacuum;134 nor should law merely represent the 
application of rules as controlling the outcome of a dispute.  For 
example, saying that the First Amendment protects free speech and 
therefore, the prior restraint doctrine prohibits issuance of a 
preliminary injunction barring third-party trade secret disclosure is a 
one-dimensional analysis.135  Real law utilizes a multi-dimensional 
 
 131 See Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49-51. 
 132 See Knights, 807 F. Supp. at 1433 (stating that rather than treating First Amendment 
rights as absolute, the Supreme Court has subordinated such rights to other societal interests 
in some situations). 
 133 Commercial speech that is false or misleading can be regulated and restricted in some 
cases. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 771-72  (1976).  Additionally, the government may be allowed to bar commercial 
speech related to illegal activity. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 
(1983).  See generally Gold Coast Publn, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1347 (1994) (First 
Amendment provides less protection for commercial speech than for non-commercial 
speech). 
 134 See Portland Residence, Inc. v. Minn. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 274 N.W.2d 500, 502 
(Minn. 1979). 
 135 No document, including the Constitution and its Amendments, can cover all 
situations because things evolve over time and the drafters could not foresee all the 
situations to which the Constitution would be applied. Consequently, the general principles 
embodied in the Constitution and its Amendments must be applied in a constantly changing 
world. This concept is still applicable today.  Joseph Albo, a Spanish Jewish philosopher, 
stated during the fourteenth century: It is impossible for the Torah of God to have covered 
all possible cases that may ever arise, because the new situations that constantly arise in 
human affairs, in law, and as a result of human enterprise are so manifold that a book cannot 
encompass them. Therefore, general principles, which the Torah only briefly suggests, were 
revealed orally to Moses at Sinai, so that . . . [rabbinic] authorities of every generation 
would use them to derive new laws. See MENACHEM ELON ET AL, JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT 
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analysis. Competing interests and policies must be identified and 
balanced.136  Additionally, there must be an understanding of the 
need to engage in such a balancing. Justice Cardozo stated: 
[T]he work of deciding cases in accordance with 
precedents that plainly fit them is a process similar in its 
nature to that of deciding cases in accordance with a 
statute.  It is a process of search, comparison, and little 
more.  Some judges seldom get beyond that process in any 
case.  Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of 
the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases 
spread out upon their desk.  The sample nearest in shade 
supplies the applicable rule.  But, of course, no system of 
living law can be evolved by such a process, and no judge 
of a high court, worthy of his office, views the function of 
his place so narrowly.137 
If that were all there was to our calling, there would be 
little of intellectual interest about it.  The man who had the 
best card index of the cases would also be the wisest 
judge.  It is when the colors do not match, when the 
references in the index fail, when there is no decisive 
precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins.138 
Consideration must be given to the surrounding facts and 
circumstances because they can ultimately alter the balance of 
competing policies in an area of law.139  Today, the availability of the 
Internet is often asserted as a ground for radical changes in the 
law.140  However, this impulse should be resisted.141  Throughout 
 
IVRI): CASES & MATERIALS 6 (1999) (quoting Sefer ha-Ikkarim 3:23). 
 136 See generally supra note 99. 
 137 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21 (1921). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally Square Construction Co. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 657 F.2d 
68, 72 (4th Cir. 1981) (competing policies must be balanced in view of all the facts). 
 140 In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13293,  at *18 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), the Court noted that [s]ome of the evidence in this case strongly suggests 
that some companies operating in the area of the Internet may have a misconception that, 
because their technology is somewhat novel, they are somehow immune from the ordinary 
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history numerous innovations and advances have created more 
efficient systems to disseminate data.  For example, development of 
the mail system, printing press, telegraph, telephone, radio and 
television all represent vast improvements in the ability to 
disseminate information.  The Internet is simply the most recent, 
albeit the most effective, technological advance useful in the 
dissemination of information.142 
While the giant technological leap represented by the Internet must 
be noted, this reality should be kept in perspective.  The Internet 
represents a highly efficient distribution mechanism that allows rapid 
transfer of information worldwide in a matter of minutes.143  It is 
therefore important to remember the fundamental underlying policy 
considerations that have shaped and developed freedom of speech 
rights, private property rights and intellectual property law.  
Although the existence of the Internet may alter the weight given to 
particular considerations, the underlying policies should be kept in 
mind. 
 
application of the laws of the United States, including copyright law. They need to 
understand that the laws domain knows no such limits. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael 
J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment In An Online World, 
28 CONN. L. REV. 1137 (1996) (arguing that existing First Amendment law is not easily 
applicable to Internet). See generally In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 127 F. 
Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Md. 2001) (stating that determining jurisdiction on the basis of 
geographic boundaries is archaic in light of Internet). 
 141 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Tex. 
1997) (noting that in copyright infringement cases the court should strictly apply intellectual 
property laws to e-commerce for the public interest).  Recent history has demonstrated that 
some courts have had difficulty applying traditional legal concepts in the face of 
technological advances. For example, the copyrightability of computer software was 
initially problematic for courts.  Ultimately, the courts realized that software was simply 
another way of expressing information and therefore that expression was within the domain 
of copyright law. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d 
Cir. 1983).  Additionally, the issue of whether computer software was considered a good 
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code was initially a disputed issue.  Today, 
software is generally considered a good.  See Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 
672 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 142 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that the 
Internet enables people to communicate with one another with unprecedented speed and 
efficiency); State of Florida v. Cohen, 696 So. 2d 435, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that the Internet allows virtually instantaneous worldwide distribution of images). 
 143 See David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997). 
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Arguably, the Internet did not create the need for strong property 
protection for intellectual property.  However, it has exacerbated the 
problem of unauthorized copying and distribution of intellectual 
property, which militates in favor of strong private property 
protection for intellectual property.144 
V. PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A BALANCING ACT 
Despite the legitimate economic reasons dictating protection of 
intellectual property,145 such protection must be balanced against the 
important rights afforded under the First Amendment.  Specifically, 
the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .146  This part 
will examine the various bodies of intellectual property law in light 
of their impact, if any, on freedom of speech. 
A. Patent Law 
Patent law grants a patent owner the exclusive right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented 
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
 
 144 See Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 140, at 1159 (stating that the Internet facilitates 
unauthorized copying and dissemination of intellectual property). In fact, it is the overall 
efficiency of the Internet that has caused some enterprises to increase enforcement of their 
intellectual property rights. For example, the music industry has always been the victim of 
unauthorized copying of its intellectual property. Nevertheless, this was not a serious 
problem due to the inability to make large numbers of high quality recordings. Additionally, 
even if large numbers of copies were made it was expensive and time consuming to engage 
in widespread distribution of those copies. The Internet, coupled with modern personal 
computers and readily available software, allows almost perfect copies of music to be easily 
placed on the Internet for negligible cost. Additionally, such copies can made available 
worldwide to hundreds of millions of individuals in a matter of minutes. See A&M Records 
v. Napster Inc., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 1941 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Recording Indus. Assn 
of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 145 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (provides an incentive for investment and innovation). 
 146 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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into the United States147 for a limited time period.148  Such 
inventions can be new or improved processes, machines, 
manufactures or compositions of matter.149  These invention 
categories are broadly construed by judicial decision150 and include 
methods of doing business.151 
Nevertheless, a prerequisite to obtaining patent protection is the 
filing of a patent application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office pursuant to an administrative procedure called patent 
prosecution.152  The application must fully disclose the invention 
including how the invention can be constructed and utilized.153  The 
disclosure, which typically includes detailed diagrams,154 must be 
sufficiently specific so that someone skilled in the relevant field of 
technology could make and use the invention.155  If the patent is 
issued at the end of the prosecution process, the patent application 
and all documentation created during the administrative proceeding 
becomes available to the public.156  Additionally, recent legislation 
 
 147 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).  Additionally, an owner of a patented process can 
extend her patent rights to any products made by the patented process. Id. at §154(a)(2). 
 148 Id. § 154(a)(2) (twenty-year patent term measured from date patent application filed). 
 149 Id. § 101. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed 
and reduced to a different state or thing. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981) 
(quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877)). A machine is a structure or device 
distinguished by its mode of operation. See Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570-71 (1863). A 
manufacture is an article produced from raw or prepared materials as a result of giving such 
materials new forms, qualities or properties. See American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 
283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931). A composition of matter includes all compositions of two or more 
substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or 
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 
279, 280 (D.C. 1957)). 
 150 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (stating that patentable 
subject matter should be broadly construed to include anything made by man). 
 151 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 152 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN, ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 708 (1998). 
 153 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 154 Id. § 113. 
 155 Id. § 112. 
 156 Id. § 122 (b)(1)(A).  This information is typically called the file history or the 
prosecution history. See Summa v. Energy Conservation Prod., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1891, 1893 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  Older cases refer to it as the file wrapper. See Autogiro Co. 
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makes patent applications, in some cases, available via publication 
eighteen months after they are filed even if the patent has not yet 
issued.157  Such information is freely accessible from the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office because government-granted patent rights are 
premised on full public disclosure.158 
The underlying purpose of the patent law is to provide benefits to 
the public with the creation of new inventions.159  The patent rights 
granted to the inventor are merely the incentive to encourage 
investment of time and resources in inventive activities.160 
Despite the rights granted pursuant to the patent law, in general the 
patent law does not conflict with the First Amendment. The patent 
owner has the right to control the use of the invention.161  However, 
anyone is free to reproduce and disseminate any information about 
the invention including copies of the patent.  The invention can be 
freely and fully reviewed, discussed, described and criticized.  The 
rights granted to the patent owner typically involve the ability of the 
patent owner to prohibit third-party conduct.  Namely, the owner can 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling or 
importing the patented invention.162  All of these rights primarily 
prohibit the type of conduct that is normally associated with property  
 
of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 398 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 157 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (1999). 
 158 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). 
 159 See id. at 480. See also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(The reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation and its fruits: new jobs and 
new industries, new consumer goods and trade benefits.).  See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) ([U]ltimate goal of the patent 
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through 
disclosure.); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833) ([P]atent law was designed for 
the public benefit.). 
 160 Shaw, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 319; see also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241 
(1832). 
 161 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 162 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (1994). 
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ownership and is normally protected by a property-based rule.163  
Consequently, injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy.164 
The existence of damages should not be controlling under a 
property-based action.  The invasion of the owners property rights 
should be actionable in the same way that a property owner can 
obtain an injunction against a continuing trespass despite a lack of 
any demonstrable economic damages.165  Therefore, use of a 
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to redress 
alleged patent infringement does not invade the domain of the First 
Amendment. Hence, a prior restraint concern does not arise. 
However, it is possible to argue that some of the conduct 
proscribed by the patent law includes both a conduct and a speech 
component.  Arguably, prohibiting third parties from making, using, 
selling or importing a patented invention does not involve speech, 
but rather deals strictly with conduct.  But the patent owners right to 
prohibit anyone from offering the invention for sale restricts 
commercial speech,166 to some extent, in addition to conduct.167 
Marketing and advertising clearly involve commercial speech, 
which the Supreme Court has viewed as within the domain of First 
Amendment free speech protection.  This raises 168 the question of 
whether offers to sell an invention are limited to legally sufficient 
contractual offers or are more broadly construed to include 
marketing and advertising activities.169  To date, few courts have 
 
 163 See generally Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149 (stating that patent law creates property 
rights). 
 164 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (showing statutory authority for court to grant injunctive 
relief to protect patent owners rights). 
 165 See generally STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, § 7.1, at 415. 
 166 Commercial speech includes speech that proposes a commercial transaction. See 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.  Commercial speech can also include 
advertising. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69. 
 167 See Agar Corp. v. Multi-Fluid Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1450 (S.D. Tex. 
1997) (offering to sell patented product became an act of patent infringement on January 1, 
1996). See generally Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 232-37; Robert Ryan Morishita, 
Patent Infringement After GATT: What is an Offer to Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905, 916-30 
(1997). 
 168 See Morishita, supra note 167, at 916-27. 
 169 Several commentators believe it is unclear whether future judicial opinions will 
analyze the meaning of offer to sell broadly to cover advertising and other promotional 
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addressed this issue.  One court has stated that a magazine 
advertisement for an allegedly infringing gun holster was an offer to 
sell.170  Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
held that mailing eight letters to four different companies describing 
the products for sale and quoting prices was an offer for sale even if 
the letters did not create a contractual offer.171  The Court rejected 
state contract law as controlling, holding that the meaning of offer 
for sale would be broadly construed.172  Hence, a patent owner has a 
statutory right to prohibit certain commercial speech in the form of 
advertising and marketing activities with regard to a patented 
invention. 
In light of the ability of a patent owner to interfere with 
commercial speech, should preliminary relief be an appropriate 
response to a patent infringement action?  A third party charged with 
patent infringement on these grounds will ultimately be an infringer 
only if the invention offered for sale does in fact infringe the patent 
owners invention.  In the event the alleged infringing device is held 
not to infringe at the conclusion of a trial on the merits, any 
preliminary relief issued at the start of the case will have had the 
effect of prohibiting lawful speech during the course of the trial.  
Under traditional prior restraint theory the possibility of barring 
legally protected speech renders issuance of preliminary relief 
impermissible.173  Nevertheless, commercial speech has been held to 
have less protection than non-commercial speech.174  Additionally, 
other limitations on both commercial and non-commercial speech 
 
activities, or narrowly to only cover an offer that rises to the level of a contractual offer. 
Nevertheless, these commentators believe a broad interpretation is warranted. See Edwin D. 
Garlepp, An Analysis of the Patentees New Exclusive Right to Offer to Sell, 81 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY, 315, 318-25 (1999); Morishita, supra note 167, at 916-27. 
 170 See DeSantis v. Hafner Creations, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 419, 426 (E.D. Va. 1996); see 
also Lifting Tech., Inc. v. Dixon Indus. Inc., No. CV-96-98-M-CC, 1996 WL 653391, at *3 
(D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1996) (stating that magazine advertisement that shows infringing device 
and provides toll-free number for customers to call to obtain product information constitutes 
an offer to sell in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). 
 171 See 3D Sys. Inc. v. Aarotech Lab. Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 172 Id. at 1379. 
 173 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 169-73. 
 174 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, at 800-01. 
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have been upheld.175  This indicates that the Supreme Court has 
balanced the underlying policies of the First Amendment against 
competing considerations in other contexts.  In light of these 
limitations, the important considerations underlying the First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections must be balanced against 
the underlying policies of protecting the rights of a patent owner.176 
Offering a product for sale falls within the category of commercial 
speech; hence, such speech is subject to at least some degree of 
regulation.177  The commercial goal of a third-party offer to sell a 
patented product is to ultimately receive a commercial gain from 
such sale.  However, the sale of the patented invention is an unlawful 
act.178  Consequently, the only purpose of the offer for sale is to 
further the unlawful act of patent infringement.  Little justification 
exists for protecting such commercial speech.179 
Nevertheless, whether a particular product or method infringes an 
issued patent is often unclear.  An issued patent contains claims 
which set out the legal metes and bounds of the patented 
invention.180  Such claims are written in a highly specialized format 
which does not always clearly put the public on notice of precisely 
what is protected by the patent.181  Patent infringement can turn on 
the meaning of a single word in a claim.182  Claims may also be 
written in a means plus function format, which describes an 
invention in terms of its function.183  For example, a claim for an 
electronic device may be written in a functional format, which 
 
 175 See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text. 
 176 See SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 131-41 (determining scope of legal principles, 
including freedom of speech under First Amendment, requires balancing of relevant policies 
and interests). 
 177 See generally supra note 133. 
 178 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). 
 179 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (stating that the government may be allowed to bar 
commercial speech related to illegal activity). 
 180 See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 181 See generally MARTIN J. ADELMAN, ET AL, supra note 152, at 642-47 (brief overview 
of patent claims). 
 182 See, e.g., Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (meaning of claim turned on what was meant by the word reaction). 
 183 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
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describes the function of the various elements of the invention 
without describing the precise components.184  Typically, such 
functional elements are limited to the structural components actually 
described in the patent specification.185  However, the claim 
language may also cover elements that are equivalent to but not 
mentioned in the specification or claims.186  Determining whether an 
element or component is equivalent is often difficult.187 
Finally, courts may apply the equitable doctrine of equivalents to 
enlarge the scope of patent claims to cover a competitors product 
despite the fact that the product falls beyond the metes and bounds of 
the claim at issue.188  This doctrine, recently upheld by the Supreme 
Court,189 conflicts with the notice function of claims by rendering the 
precise scope of a claim uncertain absent judicial evaluation of a 
claim.190  A competitor may therefore have difficulty determining if 
a product or method infringes a patented invention. 
Even if an invention is covered by the patent claims, an alleged 
infringer is entitled to contest the validity of a patent in an 
infringement suit.191  In such an action, a court is free to determine if 
the patent was properly issued.192  Hence, any preliminary relief in a 
patent infringement action restricting offers for sale may also restrict 
legitimate commercial speech during the course of the infringement 
litigation.  This militates against utilization of such relief except for 
actions where infringement is clear, such as in the case of intentional 
infringement. 
 
 184 See generally Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 
1060 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discusses means plus function claiming used in patent for apparatus 
for analyzing electrocardiographic signals). 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intl, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 188 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (brief discussion of doctrine), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001); see also 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1950). 
 189 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). 
 190 See id. at 28-29; see also Festo, 234 F.3d at 564. 
 191 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994). 
 192 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (court held 
patents invalid in patent infringement actions). 
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Additionally, the importance of preserving freedom of speech in a 
free democratic state193 suggests that such a right should be protected 
unless a countervailing legitimate state interest is contravened.  The 
patent law creates private property rights in inventions specifically to 
benefit the public, which reaps the rewards of inventive activity.194 
Therefore, the fundamental question is whether the denial of 
preliminary relief in a patent infringement action interferes with the 
public benefit received from patents.  The answer to this question 
depends largely upon whether infringing activities are fully 
compensable via remedies available subsequent to a trial on the 
merits that finds the existence of infringement. 
The property interests created by patent law are really economic 
rights that allow an inventor to reap a monetary reward based on the 
economic market value of her invention.195  Consequently, any loss 
or injury due to third-party infringement is economic in nature.  
Therefore, the property owner can be accurately compensated 
through economic damages.  The patent owner is thus not deprived 
of the ability to be made economically whole after an action for 
infringement if preliminary relief restraining offers to sell by the 
infringer are denied. 
Additionally, economic loss will not generally flow from mere 
third-party offers to sell.  Typically, a third party will only have 
economic gain, at the expense of the patent owner, if she actually 
uses or sells the patented invention.  These activities all involve 
actions rather than speech so they are subject to preliminary relief in 
an appropriate situation without impinging on the freedom of speech 
rights under the First Amendment. 
In light of the above discussion, prohibiting preliminary injunctive 
relief with regard to third-party offers to sell a patented invention has 
 
 193 See U.S. v. Treatman, 408 F. Supp. 944, 954 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (free speech and free 
communication is the essence of democracy). 
 194 See United States v. Winner, 28 F.2d 295, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1928) (primary purpose of 
the patent laws is to benefit the public), affd, 33 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1929). 
 195 See Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? 
An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 219, 233 
(1997)  (The decision to patent an invention is . . . an economic one, enabling its owner to 
profit without risk of competition.). 
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little impact on the economic rights of a patent owner.  Therefore, 
denial of this remedy is unlikely to dissuade inventors from engaging 
in inventive activities and seeking patent protection for their 
inventions.  As a result, the basic underlying goal of patent law, to 
benefit the public from disclosure of new inventions,196 will not be 
diminished or affected.  Therefore, on balance, preliminary relief 
restricting offers to sell a patented invention should be denied. 
B. Copyright Law 
Copyright law was originally designed to protect printed works 
that were published.197  From its inception the law interfered with 
speech since the owner of a copyrighted book had the legal right to 
restrict others from copying and distributing that book.  
Nevertheless, such restrictions provide an economic incentive for 
authors to maximize distribution of their work for their own gain.198 
This facilitates widespread public distribution of published works, 
which can then increase the pool of public knowledge.  
Consequently, the underlying policy of copyright law, to bestow 
property status on original works of authorship in order to reap the 
resultant public benefit, is also furthered.199 
Modern copyright law provides an author with certain exclusive 
rights in her original works.  These include the right to make 
copies,200 the right to make derivative works,201 the right to distribute  
 
 196 See supra note 194. 
 197 See BARRETT, supra note 78, at 354 (noting first U.S. copyright statute protected 
maps, charts and books for fourteen-year term). 
 198 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 199 See id. (quoting Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)). 
 200 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994). 
 201 Id. § 106(2).  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (A derivative work is a work based 
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recordings, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.). 
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the work,202 and the right to publicly display203 and publicly perform 
certain works.204 
The domain of copyright law has expanded beyond books to 
include almost any original work of authorship that is memorialized 
in a permanent form.205  Copyright law predominantly provides 
property status to speech and other forms of communication.206  
Hence, unlike patent law, which is focused primarily on restricting 
conduct,207 the copyright law has a direct impact on speech.  In light 
of this, preliminary relief in copyright infringement actions has the 
potential to be problematic.  Nevertheless, copyright law contains 
built-in limitations that alleviate, to some degree, its impact on 
freedom of speech. 
Most importantly, copyright law does not protect ideas, concepts 
or principles, but 208 merely protects the form of expression from 
unauthorized copying.209  For example, if a journalist writes a news 
 
 202 Id. § 106(3). However, this distribution right is limited. For example, if the owner of 
a copyright in a book sells a copy of the book to a third party that third party is free to 
dispose of that copy by transfer or otherwise. The initial sale by the copyright owner 
terminates or cuts off the distribution right with regard to the specific copy sold. This is 
referred to as the first sale doctrine. See id. § 109(a). Recent amendments to the first sale 
doctrine have limited it with regard to sound recordings and software. See id. § 109(b)-(e). 
 203 The public display right applies to literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual images 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.  See id. § 106(5). It also applies to sound 
recordings performed via a digital audio transmission. See id. § 106(6). 
 204 The public performance right applies to literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures or other audiovisual works.  See id. 
§ 106(4). 
 205 See id. § 102(a) (The copyright statute specifically notes that the following are 
copyrightable: literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and 
choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, sound recordings and architectural works.)  The statute is not limited to 
these categories. It also includes, for example, software.  See Apple Computer, Inc., 714 
F.2d at 1248. 
 206 See id. 
 207 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 208 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
 209 Copyrights idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an authors expression. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). See 
also United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that 
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story about a recent event, a third party is free to extract the relevant 
information from the story and utilize it to write her own story.  
Copyright merely prohibits the third party from copying the specific 
words used by the journalist.  In the event the underlying information 
is not separable from the way it is expressed, the form of expression 
can be freely utilized in order to prevent the journalist from having a 
property interest in the underlying factual information.210 
Additionally, the scope of protection is relevant to the type of 
information contained in the copyrighted work.  Purely fictional 
works receive a higher degree of protection than factual works.211  
Many believe that because a purely fictional work contains more 
originality than a factual work, it contains more intellectual property 
and is therefore entitled to more protection.  Additionally, fictional 
works are more analogous to traditional property in that the author 
creates the works from the raw material of real-life experiences in 
the same way that a carpenter creates a cabinet from wood.  Facts, in 
contrast, are merely discovered rather than created.212  Therefore, 
they are not analogous to traditional property.  Additionally, some 
believe that factual works are more important to public discourse 
because the free flow of factual matter greatly limits the ability of the 
government to restrict freedom.213  Hence, limiting protection of 
factual works furthers the underlying policy concerns of the First 
Amendment.214 
The fair use doctrine provides another limitation on the rights of 
a copyright owner.215  This doctrine is a common law doctrine,216 
codified in the copyright law, which allows third parties, in certain 
 
copyrights idea/expression dichotomy resolves the tension between copyright and freedom 
of speech). 
 210 See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (Where an idea and the expression merge, or are inseparable, the expression 
is not given copyright protection.). 
 211 See generally Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 
(1991) (holding that facts receive minimal copyright protection). 
 212 See Miller, 650 F.2d  at 1368-69. 
 213 See generally supra notes 25 and 27. 
 214 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 215 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
 216 See  SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21690, at * 19 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
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cases, to legally ignore the rights of copyright owners.217  
Traditionally, use of copyrighted works for a parody,218 or for 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching or scholarship are 
exempted from being subject to an infringement action.219  Other 
uses of copyrighted works, such as for classroom teaching,220 are 
also exempted from the protection of the copyright law.221  Such 
exempted uses reflect important forms of communication that are the 
types of speech the First Amendment seeks to protect from 
government intervention. 
In determining whether use of a copyrighted work is a fair use, a 
court evaluates several statutory factors.222  However, the key factor 
is whether the use has an economic effect on the copyright owners 
property rights.223  This economic focus suggests an attempt to 
protect the economic value of a copyright owners work224 while 
minimizing the effect on freedom of speech.  The fair use doctrine 
can therefore be viewed as an attempt to balance the important 
underlying goals of the First Amendment with the goal of protecting 
property that falls within the domain of the copyright law.225 
Despite the above limitations on the scope of copyright rights, real 
life applications of the above limitations turn on distinctions that 
have proven difficult for judicial decision makers.  The distinction 
between an idea and the form of expression of that idea is often 
unclear.226  Distinguishing between infringing use of a copyrighted 
work and fair use of such work has been a source of considerable, 
 
 217 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
 218 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 219 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
 220 See id. § 110(1). 
 221 See, e.g., id. § 110(3) (certain uses permitted in religious services). 
 222 Purpose and character of use; nature of copyrighted work; amount of copyrighted 
work used; and effect upon potential market for or value of copyrighted work. See id. § 107. 
 223 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
 224 See U.S. v. Norwest Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21360, at * 5 (D. Minn. 1995)  
(Copyright Act exists to protect the economic interests of the copyright holder and thereby 
provide an incentive to produce works). 
 225 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
 226 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.13[A], at 77-79 (3d 
ed. 1999) (distinction between idea and expression easy to state but hard to apply in 
practice). 
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and long-term, controversy.227  Identifying a parody of a copyrighted 
work has also proven difficult.228  Consequently, preliminary relief 
will probably restrict lawful speech protected by the First 
Amendment in some situations. 
However, in light of the above limitations built into copyright law, 
any intrusion into the domain of First Amendment rights is, at most, 
minimal.  In contrast, failure to protect the property rights of 
copyright owners can have substantial societal and marketplace 
consequences.  The creation of works of authorship may be deterred 
because the ability to freely pirate such works would substantially 
reduce potential economic gain, thus reducing the societal 
enrichment that flows from creative works, and consequently 
affecting business enterprises that rely on copyright law to protect 
their investment in intellectual property.229 
One of the basic underlying policies of preliminary injunctive 
relief is prevention of irreparable injury.230  Additionally, preliminary 
relief is appropriate when damages are difficult to award because 
they are hard to quantify despite their existence.231  Both of these 
policies are applicable to copyrighted works.  Intellectual property, 
unlike tangible property, is hard to control and subject to multiple 
simultaneous uses by different parties.  In some cases, once 
intellectual property is released to the public it is impossible to 
regain control over the property.  This is especially true with 
copyrighted works which can easily be copied and distributed. For 
example, the widespread use of the Internet has allowed the 
 
 227 See id. § 10.2, at 319 ([fair use] is an elusive doctrine, reputed to be the most 
troublesome in copyright law). 
 228 See id. § 10.14, at 338-43 (discussing parody). 
 229 See generally Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a 
Culturally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 855, 858 (1996) 
(growing perception that failure to protect intellectual property rights serves as a strong 
disincentive to foreign investment). 
 230 See supra note 117. 
 231 The Copyright Act appears to explicitly recognize this problem. It provides a 
copyright owner the option of electing to recover actual or statutory damages from an 
infringer. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1994). Statutory damages are in the range of $500 to 
$20,000 with the amount set by what the court considers just. See id. § 504(c)(1). 
Additionally, the court has discretion to increase statutory damages up to $100,000 if the 
infringement was willful. See id. § 504(c)(2). 
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unauthorized worldwide distribution of unlimited copies of musical 
creations.232  Once released onto the Internet, the copyright owner 
has little realistic chance of ever regaining control over all of those 
copies.233  Nor will she be able to even know the quantity of illegal 
copies that were made and distributed, making it virtually impossible 
to determine the extent of economic injury suffered by the copyright 
owner.  Consequently, preliminary relief is appropriate to protect the 
copyright owners property rights because in the absence of such a 
remedy, the value of her property will be substantially reduced, if not 
destroyed.  The importance of protecting the marketplace or 
economic value of private property, as previously discussed, from 
substantial diminution necessitates accepting the minimal intrusion 
into the freedom of speech arena.234 
C. Trademark Law 
Justice Frankfurter stated:   
The protection of trademarks is the laws recognition of 
the psychological function of symbols.  If it is true that we 
live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods 
by them.  A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which 
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he 
had been led to believe he wants.  The owner of a 
trademark exploits this human propensity by making 
every human effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the 
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.  
Whatever  the  means  employed,  the  aim is  the same   
 
 232 See generally Kenneth D. Suzan, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine 
Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. REV. 789 
(1995). 
 233 See generally id. at 794  (Internet makes it difficult for copyright owners to track use 
of intellectual property). 
 234 See Hartman, supra note 2, at 444 (noting that historically application of copyright 
law not restricted by First Amendment); see also LEAFFER, supra note 226, at 458 
(discussing idea/expression distinction coupled with the fair use doctrine provides a balance 
between copyright and the First Amendment). 
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to convey  through  the mark, in the minds of potential 
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which 
it appears.235 
Trademarks represent a method of identifying and distinguishing 
products from those sold by competitors.236  This allows members of 
the intended consumer market to easily identify specific products.237  
For example, a consumer seeking a non-aspirin headache relief 
medicine would recognize the trademark TYLENOL on a product 
package located on a store shelf.238  Trademarks therefore limit 
consumer confusion in making choices between various products 
available in the marketplace.239 
The amount of trademark recognition is generally directly 
proportionate to the amount of advertising and marketing conducted 
by a business enterprise.240  Such activities are extremely costly.241  
Hence, trademarks require protection of extensive monetary 
investments in advertising and marketing.242  Lack of such protection 
 
 235 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 
(1942). 
 236 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining a trademark as any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof . . . used . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.). 
 237 See id. § 1053 (noting that modern trademark law permits the use of service marks 
which serve the same function as trademarks except that they are directed to identifying and 
distinguishing services rather than products). 
 238 Trademarks such as TYLENOL, McDONALDS, COKE, PEPSI and SONY are all 
well known to most members of the general public. Trademarks can also have significant 
value and name recognition in very specific or narrow markets. For example, PARK is a 
well-known maker of bicycle tools, which is highly recognized among bicycle mechanics. 
However, it is relatively unknown to the general public or even to those who use tools other 
than special tools for working on bicycles. Likewise, WEST, a well-known trademark 
among lawyers and other professionals who use legal publications, is generally not well 
known to the general public. 
 239 See NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) 
([T]rademark law is designed to prevent sellers from confusing or deceiving consumers 
about the origin or make of a product. . .). 
 240 See id. 
 241 See id. 
 242 See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(evidence advertising expenditures to develop recognition of trademark exceeded $42 
million); S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1-17 (1946) (trademark law prevents consumer confusion and 
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would be a disincentive for commercial enterprises to heavily invest 
in marketing and advertising.243  The result would also be increased 
consumer marketplace confusion. 
Protection of trademarks, like the protection of other intellectual 
property, promotes innovation, ultimately benefiting the public.  The 
ability of a producer to create a strong trademark makes her products 
highly recognizable to consumers.244  This provides a strong 
incentive for competitors to develop superior products that compete 
directly with established products.245  Often, the only way of 
convincing consumers to switch from an established brand to a new 
competing brand is to create a superior product.246  This provides 
pressure on the established brand to maintain its superiority and to 
continuously improve its product to minimize the likelihood that a 
superior competing product will establish market dominance.247  
Ultimately, the public benefits from this competition because 
producers have a direct economic incentive to continuously provide 
products that meet marketplace demands in order to maintain 
economic viability.248 
Furthermore, knock-offs, or copies of successful products may 
also enter the marketplace based solely on a price differential 
 
protects investment of trademark owner in establishing consumer recognition of trademark); 
see also Quality Inns Intl, Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 212 (D. Md. 1988) 
(McDonalds spends almost a billion dollars a year on marketing and advertising.).  See 
generally Smith, supra note 60 (COCA-COLA trademark valued at $34 billion by Coca-
Cola Company). 
 243 See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:3, at 2-4 (quoting William F. Baxter, former 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of Justice Department Antitrust division). 
 244 Business people regard trademarks as valuable assets and are willing to pay large 
sums to buy or license a well-known mark. Id. § 2:14 at 2-32. 
 245 See generally Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164 (noting that trademark law promotes 
production of quality goods). 
 246 Humans have a psychological momentum to continue doing the same thing in the 
same way as was done in the past. Buying habits are no exception. There is a comforting 
security in returning to a product or service with which one is familiar. MCCARTHY, supra 
note 5, § 2:18, at 2-39. 
 247 See Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). 
 248 See Monarch Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam Intl Ltd., Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 
1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988) (discussing that trademark law facilitates 
economic efficiency)). 
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achieved by free-riding249 on the market created by the established 
product which is sold under a well-known trademark. Such free-
riders can undersell existing brands because they do not have 
extensive advertising and marketing costs to recoup.250  This 
competition creates downward price pressure on the established 
product.251  Additionally, it spurs the company that sells the 
established product to improve the existing product and to develop 
new products that are superior in order to retain the consumer 
association with its trademark.252 Both of these consequences benefit 
the public.253 
In addition to improving existing products, an effective technique 
for economic success is the development of new products to satisfy 
newly identified markets or new market segments identified in 
established consumer markets.254  Such new products can often be 
successful if they fulfill a market demand simply due to being first in 
the marketplace.  Such a market lead can enable a new product to 
gain substantial market share if a trademark is utilized to develop 
brand recognition via advertising and marketing.  However, this can 
take time since a new trademark does not have instant consumer 
recognition.  Often, an existing trademark that is well established can 
provide almost instantaneous consumer recognition for a totally new 
 
 249 Free-riding is the diversion of value from a business rivals efforts without 
payment. Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 250 See General Leaseways, Inc., 744 F.2d at 592-93; see also Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. 
Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 418  (2d Cir. 1952). 
 251 See Crystal D. Talley, Japans Retreat from Reverse Engineering: An Unnecessary 
Surrender, 29 CORNELL INTL L.J. 807, 822 (1996) (increased competition reduces prices). 
 252 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 452-54 (1999) 
(argues free-riding can promote innovation). 
 253 Typically, a product copier can use the trademark of an established product on their 
version of the product for comparative purposes. For example, a store brand copy of 
TYLENOL could include a legend on it that states Equivalent to TYLENOL, provided the 
statement is in fact truthful and the packaging makes it clear the copier is not trying to pass-
off the copy as the established product. This encourages competition but it also allows the 
copier to get a free ride from the market reputation that TYLENOL has created as a 
consequence of substantial advertising and marketing expenditures. Arguably, this result, 
although not totally fair to the trademark owner, is necessitated by the important policies of 
freedom of speech and the policy of favoring promotion of competition. In this case, it 
represents a judicial balancing of these policies against private intellectual property rights. 
 254 See Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 
2094 (1989). 
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product.255  Such market extension of the trademark to a new product 
is dependent upon the trademark having very strong recognition 
value to members of the target consumer market.256 
Likewise, a strong trademark can enable a company to engage in 
geographic market extension by entering new geographic regions in 
which it had not previously done business.257  This is especially 
important to a business that starts locally and utilizes franchising to 
expand regionally or nationally.258  A well recognized trademark 
allows the business to quickly attract business in new geographic 
markets.   The ability to  use a well-known  trademark  to  enter  new 
 
 255 For example, DANNON is a well-known yogurt producer that entered the bottled 
water market several years ago. They utilize the well-recognized DANNON trademark on 
their bottled water which enables consumers to instantly associate their water with the 
company that sold a popular yogurt. Arguably, this extension of the trademark from yogurt 
to bottled water allows quicker consumer recognition of their water than would otherwise 
have been achieved without the use of the DANNON trademark. 
  Some companies also use a single identical mark on all of their products (often called 
a house-mark) coupled with a second unique mark which is different for each product. If 
the house-mark is strong, any new product generates immediate consumer recognition 
which is often transferred to the new mark used on the product. For example, McDonalds 
might use McDONALDS as its house mark on each of its sandwiches. In addition, it might 
use a second mark, unique to each product, on individual products (e.g. EGG McMUFFIN). 
Other companies use a family of trademarks which typically involve a series of marks in 
which the same syllable or syllables appear. For example, the Eastman Kodak Company 
owns all of the following trademarks which represent a family of trademarks: KODAK, 
KODACRAFT, KODAFIX, KODAFLAT, KODAGRAPH, KODAGUIDE, KODALINE, 
KODAMATIC. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64, at 319-20. The Alberto-Culver Company 
owns a family of trademarks for hair care products that start with the TRES prefix. They 
successfully opposed federal trademark registration of the trademark TREVIVE 
NUTRIENTS FOR THE LIFE OF YOUR HAIR for hair care products by another company 
on the basis of a likelihood of confusion. See Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also McDonalds Corp. v. McBagels, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 
1268, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (court held McDonalds owns family of marks that begin with 
Mc). See generally J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonalds Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (definition of family of marks). 
 256 The Coca-Cola Company recently started marketing a line of designer clothing called 
COKE WARE. This extension of the mark to a new product strengthens consumer 
awareness of the trademark.  See Cathleen Egan, Coke is Ready to Work the Runways, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A23.  See generally Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imp. Ltd., 
544 F.2d 1167, 1174 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting owner of strong trademark may have rights to 
enter new product line). 
 257 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1690-91 (1999). 
 258 See id. 
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product and geographic markets provides an incentive for a company 
to develop strong consumer associations with its trademark.259 
The value of a trademark is its ability to create a mental 
association in the minds of consumers.260  Any third-party use of the 
trademark can alter or interfere with this mental association.  Hence, 
protection of a trademark owners property rights261 typically 
involves restricting third-party use of trademarks, or of words, 
phrases or designs, that are confusingly similar to the trademark at 
issue. Since trademarks are inherently communicative in nature any 
restriction amounts to restricting speech.262  Nevertheless, such 
restrictions are necessary, at least to some extent, to protect the 
property interests of trademark owners.263 
The property interests of trademark owners are subject to several 
limitations that reflect a balance of the private property rights of 
trademark owners against other important underlying policies 
including the publics First Amendment rights.264  Property rights in 
 
 259 The law even provides extra legal protection for well recognized marks that have 
become famous.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (federal action available for dilution of 
famous trademarks).  A state dilution action is available in about half of the states.  See 
MCCARTHY supra note 5, § 24:80 at 24-135. 
 260 [T]he exclusive property right of a trademark is defined by customer perception. 
MCCARTHY supra note 5, § 2:14 at 2-30; see also James Burrough, Ltd., 540 F.2d at 276 
(stating that trademark laws exist not to protect trademarks, but . . . to protect the 
consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the trademark owners right to 
a non-confused public.). 
 261 See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (noting that trademarks are property). 
 262 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 219 (trademarks are commercial speech). 
 263 See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding important 
underlying policy of trademark law to protect investment by trademark owner is necessary 
to create association between product and trademark). 
 264 Some limitations on the rights of trademark owners also reflect a balance between 
these private property rights and other underlying policies. For example, an action for 
trademark infringement requires that the allegedly wrongful third-party action results in a 
likelihood of consumer confusion in the intended consumer market. This reflects the fact 
that trademark law has its origins in unfair competition law rather than property law.  
Likewise, unfair competition law is arguably a species of tort law since it involves 
establishing acceptable conduct in the commercial marketplace. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. at 157; see also Lockridge v. United State, 200 U.S.P.Q. 271, 272 (BNA) (Ct. Cl. 
1978) (stating that trademark infringement sounds in tort).  At its most basic level, tort 
law involves setting a standard of conduct that is imposed on everyone.  In the commercial 
marketplace such conduct is subsumed into the area of law generally referred to as unfair 
competition law, which strives to maintain a degree of commercial morality in the 
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a trademark are generally limited to commercial activities related to 
the advertising, sale and marketing of products.  This reflects an 
understanding that the value of a trademark is primarily as an 
economic marketplace tool.265  Use of a trademark in non-
commercial contexts has limited effect on the marketing value of the 
trademark.  Hence, using a trademark in everyday speech, in news 
reporting or as a parody is typically not actionable since such uses 
are not commercial uses that compete with the trademark owners 
use of the mark to advertise, market or sell a product.266 
 
marketplace.  See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 431 F.2d at 1016 ([O]ur devotion to free 
wheeling industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the 
standard of morality expected in our commercial relations.).  Anchoring a trademark 
infringement action to consumer confusion furthers the underlying policy of maintaining 
fair competition. Likewise, limiting common law trademark rights to the geographic area of 
actual trademark use and to the products on which the trademarks were actually used is also 
consistent with maintaining fair competition. 
  Even if a trademark creates a strong mental association, trademark rights will be 
denied if the trademark is primarily a functional item for which alternatives do not exist. 
This result is necessary to prevent trademark rights from creating property rights in 
functional products which are free for anyone to use absent trade secret or patent protection 
for such products. This can be a problem with objects, such as a container, which are 
serving as trademarks. See  MCCARTHY supra note 5, § 7:63 at 7-137-139. See 15 U.S.C. § 
1115(b)(8) (functional nature of trademark defense to infringement action). Additionally, 
the color of a product has been held to be a trademark if it creates the requisite mental 
association; see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); In re Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  Nevertheless, in some cases the 
color of a product can give a company a significant market advantage. In light of this, the 
judicial doctrine of aesthetic functionality provides that trademark rights in the color of a 
product are denied if granting such rights would give the trademark owner an unfair 
competitive advantage. See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 
1982); see also Colburn v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1939) (finding 
injunctive relief available to protect trademarks provided result does not interfere with 
legitimate competition). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, 
cmt. c at 175-76 (1995). 
 265 See generally Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 (source indicating function of trademarks 
facilitates consumer product choices and protects reputation of product manufacturer). 
 266 Third parties typically are free to use descriptive aspects of a trademark in a non-
trademark sense. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64, at 320; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). Words that 
create a mental association with McDonalds Corporation are commonly used in newspaper 
articles. See McDonalds Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1272; Patrick Barta, New American Home 
is Smaller, Near CityBuilders Eschew Suburban McMansions for more Urban Flavor, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at 2A.  Such uses are typically not actionable. In contrast, 
commercial uses aimed at selling products or services are actionable. The trademark 
McBAGEL to sell bagels, McDENTAL for dental services and McSLEEP for a hotel were 
all enjoined pursuant to trademark infringement actions brought by McDonalds 
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Additionally, using a trademark for an alternative meaning is 
generally permissible.  For example, the trademark WEST is well 
known to attorneys and creates a mental association with a legal 
publisher.  Nevertheless, anyone can use the word WEST when 
giving directions, such as telling someone to proceed two miles 
WEST and then turn right.  Use of the word WEST in giving 
directions is not a commercial use, nor is it related to the marketplace 
use of the trademark.  Arguably, this illustrates that the underlying 
property interest in a trademark is not in the trademark per se, but 
rather is the mental association created by the trademark in the minds 
of consumers in the intended market.267  Viewing the property 
 
Corporation. See McDonalds Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1272 (use of McBAGEL enjoined); 
McDonalds Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, 814 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (use of 
McDENTAL enjoined); Quality Inns Intl, 695 F. Supp. 221-22 (use of McSLEEP 
enjoined); see also Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. 
Supp. 936, 948 (1st Cir. 1979) (use of trademark in a parody not actionable as trademark 
infringement). Additionally, federal trademark dilution actions under the Lanham Act (see 
supra note 259) cannot be based on use of a trademark in comparative advertising, non-
commercial use of the trademark or use of a trademark in news reporting and news 
commentary.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1998). 
 267 Trademarks that consist of made-up words are the easiest to protect under trademark 
law since the only mental association that typically exists for such words is whatever has 
been created by the advertising and marketing activities of the trademark owner. In contrast, 
it is more difficult to protect words that have existing meanings other than the mental 
association created by the trademark owner. Typically, the trademark owner can only obtain 
trademark protection for words with an alternate meaning upon a showing of secondary 
meaning. See Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185, 187 (N.C. 
1964) stating that  
[w]hen a particular business has used words . . . for so long or so exclusively or 
when it has promoted its product to such an extent that the words do not register 
their literal meaning on the public mind but are instantly associated with one 
enterprise, such words have attained a secondary meaning. This is to say, a 
secondary meaning exists when, in addition to their literal, or dictionary meaning, 
words connote to the public a product from a unique source. 
  The federal trademark law has adopted the doctrine of secondary meaning although it 
uses the word distinctive in lieu of secondary meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1999). 
This doctrine insures that trademark protection does not extend beyond the core property 
interest in a trademark by denying any protection for a trademark at issue if it is not acting 
as a trademark in the commercial marketplace. Likewise, trademark rights can be lost in the 
strongest trademarkeven a made-up wordif the mental association affiliated with the 
trademark is eliminated for any reason.  Typically, this is referred to as a trademark 
becoming a generic name for a type of product rather than being associated with a particular 
version of that product produced by a particular producer. ASPIRIN, THERMOS, 
CELLOPHANE, SHREDDED WHEAT AND ESCALATOR are all former trademarks that 
became generic. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, 
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interest this way allows the law to focus on protecting the core 
property interest in a trademark.268  This minimizes the intrusion into 
the free speech arena resulting from preliminarily enjoining third-
party use of a trademark, or a similar word, phrase or design.  Such 
an approach is analogous to the constitutional doctrine of least 
restrictive means as a measure of whether an impingement of 
constitutional rights is legally permissible.269 
The geographic area where the trademark is used in such a way 
that a mental association in the minds of consumers is created also 
defines the property interest in a trademark at common law.270  
Additionally, the products on which the trademark is affixed define 
the property interest in the trademark.271  Again, this reflects that the 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 173 (1996). The federal trademark law recognizes the need to 
prevent granting property rights in a trademark once it has lost its ability to create a mental 
association with a particular product. Rights in a trademark become incontestable if the 
mark is registered and subsequently used continuously for five years.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1065. 
However, if a mark becomes generic, its registration is subject to cancellation without 
regard for its incontestable status.  See id. §§ 1065, 1064(3). 
 268 See supra text accompanying note 267. 
 269 The Supreme Court has often evaluated the constitutionality of laws that impinge on 
constitutional rights on the basis of whether the law achieves a legitimate state interest in the 
least restrictive manner possible.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 25, § 20.10, at 39 
(least restrictive means test important in free speech arena); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 101, § 5.3, 5.3.5, at 325 (discussing that the least restrictive test applied to laws 
burdening interstate commerce); id. § 9.1.2, at 532 (discussing that the least restrictive test 
used in equal protection analysis); id. § 10.1.2, at 643-44 (stating that the least restrictive 
test used to evaluate burden on fundamental rights). But see id. § 11.3.7.3, at 888-90 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has found least restrictive test too stringent, in some 
cases, when evaluating restrictions on commercial speech). 
 270 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 96-100 (1918).  In a 
modern world many businesses start small in a local market area and then expand regionally 
and, in some cases, nationally or internationally. Therefore, the common law creates a 
problem because it does not allow a trademark owner to reserve the right to use a trademark 
in areas the business plans to enter in the future. In contrast to the common law, the federal 
trademark law (Lanham Act) allows a company, using a trademark in interstate commerce, 
to register the mark pursuant to the Lanham Act. Such registration essentially reserves 
nationwide trademark rights, which protects the ability of a business to continue to use its 
trademark as it expands geographically. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Harts Food Stores, Inc., 
267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th 
Cir. 1968).  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-1115. The Lanham Act, contrary to the 
common law, also allows registration of a trademark prior to actual use of the trademark, 
provided the owner has a bona fide intent to subsequently use the trademark. See id. § 
1051(b). 
 271 For example, different parties in the same geographic area could use the same 
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core protectable interest in a trademark is the mental association with 
the trademark as opposed to the trademark itself.272 
A successful action for trademark infringement requires third-party 
use of a trademark, or a confusingly similar word, phrase or design 
that results in a likelihood of consumer confusion in the intended 
consumer market.273  This effectively allows the core value of a 
trademark to be protected.274  The only way to evaluate whether 
third-party conduct interferes with the underlying property interest in 
a trademark, the mental association created by the trademark, is to 
ascertain whether confusion is likely to occur from the third-party 
action.  This allows all free speech uses of a trademark except for 
those that directly interfere with the primary property interest in a 
trademark. 
The above discussion reflects the fact that property rights in 
trademarks are limited to the extent necessary to protect the 
important economic interests associated with trademarks.  Typically, 
courts have balanced these rights against the underlying policy of 
promoting competition in order to strike a balance between limiting 
consumer confusion, protecting the trademark owners investment 
 
trademark without resulting consumer confusion if one party uses it in wholesaling and 
another party uses it in retailing. See Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 365; see also TCPIP 
Holding Co. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2001).  See generally 
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Sunaid Food Prods. Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 
1966) (stating that the use of similar trademarks on dissimilar or non-competing goods is 
unlikely to cause consumer confusion). 
 272 See supra text accompanying note 267. In contrast, it can be argued that the recent 
creation of a federal trademark dilution action coupled with broad interpretation of what 
constitutes a famous mark under the statute represents a subtle shift in the direction of 
providing property rights in the trademark itself rather than a property right only in the 
mental association created by use of the trademark.  See supra note 259 for brief discussion 
of dilution action. A dilution action does not require competition between the parties nor 
any likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods involved.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
Therefore, such actions are moving in the direction of protecting the actual trademark.  See 
generally TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 88. 
 273 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994); see also Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time 
Productions, 17 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 274 See James Burrough Ltd., 540 F.2d at 274 (holding that in a trademark infringement 
action the actual trademark is not infringed, but [w]hat is infringed is the right of the public 
to be free of confusion and the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his 
products reputation.). 
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and maintaining marketplace competition.275  Nevertheless, a 
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order barring activity 
that allegedly infringes a trademark has the potential to prohibit 
permissible speech.  As already discussed, the test for infringement is 
likelihood of consumer confusion.276  This is a heavily fact-
dependent question, the answer to which may be difficult to predict 
in many cases.277  Courts usually consider the following factors in 
determining infringement: strength of the trademark; similarity 
between the trademark at issue and the allegedly infringing 
trademark; proximity or similarity of the products on which the 
trademarks are used; the likelihood that the first trademark user will 
expand her product line into the alleged infringers product line 
(referred to as bridging the gap); existence of any actual consumer 
confusion; good-faith adoption of the trademark by the alleged 
infringer; relative quality of the products involved; and sophistication 
of the consumers involved.278 
The strength of a trademark can be determined, at least to some 
extent, by the amount of money and effort invested in marketing and 
advertising the trademark.279  However, since marketing varies in 
terms of effectiveness, this is not determinative.  Also, many factors 
beyond the control of the trademark owner can affect the strength of 
a trademark.280  Evaluation of the proximity of the products involved 
can be based on a variety of factors including whether they have 
dissimilar prices, whether they are sold in the same stores or whether 
they are advertised in the same periodicals.281  Traditional trademark 
 
 275 See generally supra notes 242, 260 and 263. 
 276 See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 277 See Colburn, 108 F. 2d at 378 (stating that the likelihood of confusion is a matter of 
varying human reactions and requires a determination of the purchasing publics state of 
mind  when confronted with similar trade names). 
 278 See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979) (providing 
a detailed discussion of each factor in light of facts in case). 
 279 See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125, 1127 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (advertising expenditures exceeding $42 million dollars significant factor 
supporting creation of strong mark). 
 280 Unforeseen situations or news events, for example, can affect the strength of a 
trademark since [a] critical element in determining whether a term is a trademark is the 
impression the term makes on the relevant public.  In re Remington Products, Inc., 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1714, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 91, at *4 (T.T.A.B. 1987). 
 281 See McDonalds Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1280 (noting that the use of similar 
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law provides that use of the same or a similar trademark on 
dissimilar goods is a defense to a trademark infringement action.282  
However, the use of trademarks on diverse product lines coupled 
with licensing of trademarks for use by third parties on other 
products minimizes this defense.  In light of this, courts have often 
allowed breathing room or a permissible zone of expansion for 
trademark owners with regard to preventing competitors from using 
similar trademarks on products not made by the trademark owner.283  
For example, it is not uncommon for well-known clothing designers 
to use their trademarks on perfume and other non-clothing 
products.284  This might permit a designer to enjoin a third party 
from using their trademark on a product the designer does not 
currently produce.285 
The cost of the product can also be relevant.  The amount of 
mental energy invested in a purchasing decision is proportionate to 
the cost expended to purchase the product at issue.  For example, a 
consumer will typically spend minimal time deciding which type of 
pencil to buy when such an item costs less than a dollar.  In contrast, 
a buyer of a complicated medical device, which costs hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, is likely to invest substantial time and effort in 
making a purchasing decision.  The more time spent in the decision-
making process, the less likely the buyer will be confused even if 
similar trademarks are involved.286 
All of the above factors utilized to evaluate whether infringement 
exists are intertwined with the strength of the mark.  The weaker the 
mark, the less likely the mark will have any consumer association 
beyond the specific product it is used on.  This is especially true if 
the allegedly infringing mark is not identical to the trademark 
 
advertising mediums supports the existence of consumer confusion). 
 282 See Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal., 356 F.2d at 469. 
 283 See infra note 285. 
 284 See Scarves by Vera, Inc., 544 F.2d at 1171 (finding that most top clothing designers 
also sell perfumes, cosmetics and toiletries). 
 285 See, e.g., id. (finding that well-known fashion designer, who used VERA trademark 
on womens scarves, apparel and linens was entitled to enjoin third party from using same 
trademark on cosmetics and fragrances even though designer did not make or sell any 
cosmetics or fragrances). 
 286 See McDonalds Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1279. 
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owners trademark.  In contrast, a strong mark may create a 
consumer association with almost any product and even trademarks 
that are similar but not identical.287 
The difficulty in measuring or establishing an intangible such as 
the likelihood of consumer confusion has resulted in the use of 
survey evidence as a method of establishing such confusion.288  
Ultimately, the amorphous nature of the standard for establishing 
trademark infringement suggests that predicting the likelihood of 
trademark infringement, in advance, may be difficult in many cases.  
Hence, the probability exists that preliminary relief in trademark 
infringement disputes may enjoin lawful commercial speech 
protected by the First Amendment.289  The question is whether the 
possibility of impinging on such free speech rights can be justified 
by the necessity for preliminary relief in some cases.  Arguably, 
infringing use of a trademark can have a substantial effect on the 
mental association that exists in consumer minds.  Any alteration of 
this mental association may be difficult, if not impossible, to fix after 
the fact.  Since this is the core property interest protected by 
trademark law failure to allow preliminary relief could result in 
permanent damage to a trademarks value.290  Arguably, any 
monetary damages would be difficult to calculate.291  Consequently, 
any impingement on First Amendment rights resulting from 
preliminary relief should be permitted.  As discussed above, the 
limitations of trademark law minimize the effect on speech to the 
greatest extent possible while still protecting necessary private 
property rights in trademarks. 
 
 287 See Quality Inns Intl, Inc., 695 F. Supp. at 209 (noting that there is a protected 
property interest in trademark directly proportionate to strength of trademark). 
 288 See id. at 207 (noting that in trademark infringement action, appropriate survey 
evidence meaningful to establish likelihood of confusion). 
 289 See generally Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 219-24. 
 290 See generally Faberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D. Del. 
1990) (injunctive relief necessary because monetary damages often inadequate). 
 291 See First Savings Bank v. U.S. Bancorp, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1087 (D. Kan. 2000) 
(in trademark infringement action proving damages may be difficult). 
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D. Trade Secret Law 
Trade secret law, the oldest type of intellectual property 
protection,292 provides a legal regime for protecting information that 
is economically valuable to a business enterprise.  The law is broadly 
interpreted to include inventive processes that could be protected by 
patent law.  Additionally, commercial information and other business 
know-how, which is outside the scope of patent law, are candidates 
for trade secret protection.293  The easiest way to define a trade secret 
is with a functional definition.  Anything that is not generally known 
to competitors and provides an actual or potential economic 
advantage to an enterprise is a trade secret, provided the enterprise 
takes reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy.294 
Unlike patent and copyright law, trade secret is primarily a state-
based body of law295 traditionally based on common law.  However, 
the majority of states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act.296  This Act codifies the basic principles of the common 
law, which courts continue to look to when applying and interpreting 
the Act.297 
 
 292 See PERRITT, supra note 99, at 1. 
 293 See, e.g., Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (finding that customer lists are protectable trade secrets). 
 294 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)(1985), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1990); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3) (definition of trade secret under Economic Espionage Act); see also Smith v. 
Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (stating that almost any secret knowledge or 
information used to conduct business can be trade secret). 
 295 See Smith, supra note 60, at 550.  However, recently enacted federal legislation 
creates a federal criminal action for certain types of trade secret theft. See ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE ACT, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. V 1999). 
 296 See Smith, supra note 60, at 550; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12, 14 
U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
 297 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 433- 34 (1990). The Act was 
intended to protect intellectual property and business information by eliminating some 
inherent inconsistencies that existed in the common law. See Flavorchem Corp. v. Mission 
Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 593, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Nevertheless, courts 
continue to look to prior common law rules when determining if something is a trade secret. 
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939); see also Spottiswoode v. Levine, 730 
A.2d 166, 175 (Me. 1999). 
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Trade secret law permits the possessor of a trade secret to exclude 
third parties from using the trade secret if it is acquired via improper 
means.298  Additionally, a third party who has acquired a trade secret 
by accident or mistake without engaging in unlawful or improper 
conduct may also be barred from using the trade secret.299  This right 
of exclusion supports the conclusion that a trade secret is property 
since the right to exclude others is the prime indicia of whether 
something is property.300  Nevertheless, independent creation of the 
subject matter of a trade secret by a third party is not actionable by 
the trade secret owner.301  Additionally, if a third party lawfully 
acquires an object or device, which incorporates a trade secret, she is 
free to disassemble the object to determine the trade secret it 
embodies.302  Such conduct, generally referred to as reverse 
engineering, is not actionable by the trade secret owner.303 
Consequently, the conduct of a third party is relevant to whether 
unlawful misappropriation of a trade secret has occurred. 
This focus on conduct supports an argument that actions seeking 
redress for unlawfully acquiring a trade secret are based on tort 
law.304  Additionally, it is not uncommon for a trade secret owner to 
license third parties to use a trade secret subject to certain 
 
 298 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(1) states [t]hat improper means includes theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, 
or espionage through electronic or other means. 14 U.L.A. 433, 437 (1990).  Improper 
conduct can include otherwise lawful conduct that violates no laws. See, e.g., E. I. duPont 
deNemours & Co., 431 F.2d 1012 (holding that aerial photography of an otherwise 
inaccessible construction site was under the circumstances, improper conduct). 
 299 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. at 433, 438 (1990). 
 300 See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673. But see infra note 304 (noting property 
versus tort view of trade secrets). 
 301 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476. 
 302 Reverse engineering has been defined as the process of starting with the known 
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or 
manufacture. Id. 
 303 See id. 
 304 See PERRIT, supra note 99, at 7-9 (providing a brief discussion of property versus tort 
view of trade secrets). Trade secrets were covered in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 
757 (1939). Today, however, this merely represents an historic tie to tort law. A conscious 
decision was made to omit this area of law from the Restatement (Second) of Torts because 
it was believed that trade secret law was no longer dependent on tort law. Hence, the current 
Restatement of Torts does not include trade secrets. See MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 1.01[1], 
at 1-19 to 1-20. 
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limitations.305  If the licensee uses the trade secret in violation of the 
agreement, any action by the trade secret owner against the licensee 
is, arguably, contractually based.306  Finally, rights to maintain a 
trade secret may arise from the relationship between the trade secret 
owner and others.307  For example, a principal-agent relationship is a 
fiduciary relationship that implies that the agent must maintain the 
principals trade secrets and other information in confidence.308  
Breach of confidentiality by the agent is a breach of her fiduciary 
duty which is arguably a tort theory; alternatively, the breach may be 
based on an implied contract theory or an unjust enrichment 
theory.309  These various theoretical bases underlying an action for 
misappropriation of a trade secret have caused some degree of 
confusion.310  For example, does a statute of limitations for contract 
actions or for tort actions apply to an action for misappropriation of a 
trade secret; should damages be limited to actual economic losses or 
should other types of damages, such as punitive damages, be 
available; and should injunctive relief be available as a remedy?311 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not resolve the confusion 
over the theoretical underpinnings of trade secret law.312  However, it 
provides a statute of limitations and a workable framework which 
facilitates the application of the law.313  It also specifies that actual or 
 
 305 See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that rational profit-maximizer presumably would . . . license . . . a trade secret).  
See generally MILGRIM, supra note 19, §2.02, at 2-22 (stating that trade secrets assignable 
property). 
 306 See MILGRIM, supra note 19, §2.02, at 2-22. 
 307 See id. 
 308 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395-396 (1958). 
 309 See MILGRIM, supra note 19, §2.02, at 2-22. 
 310 See MERGES, supra note 64, at 1245 (stating that trade secret law is a legal hybrid 
including elements of property and tort law); see also American Credit Indemnity Co. v. 
Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that common law trade secret law 
relied on property, quasi-contract and fiduciary duty theories); WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & 
ROBERT C. COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 8 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that 
law of trade secrets has been developed largely from the basic legal concepts of the law of 
torts, restitution, agency, trusts, quasi-contract, property and contracts). 
 311 See id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6, 14 U.L.A. 433, 462 (1990) (providing for three-
year statute of limitations). 
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threatened misappropriation of a trade secret may be enjoined;314 
money damages can be recovered for more than just actual economic 
losses;315 attorney fees can be recovered316 and damages may be 
doubled if misappropriation is willful.317 
Nevertheless, it is logical to view a trade secret as a form of 
intellectual property.318  Like other types of intellectual property, a 
trade secret is information or knowledge that is commercially 
valuable.319  A trade secret is typically a business asset resulting from 
an expenditure of time and effort.320  Providing legal protection for 
trade secrets acts as an incentive for investment in innovation.321  
 
 314 See id. § 2, at 449 (suggesting property basis for action). 
 315 See id. § 3, at 455-56 (damages available suggest tort basis for action since 
contractual theory normally limits damages to actual loss). 
 316 See id. § 4, at 459. 
 317 See id. § 3(b), at 456 (provides for punitive damages which suggests tort basis for 
action). 
 318 The wrongful conduct engaged in by a third party who acquires the trade secret may 
be tortious in nature or it may represent a breach of contract.  However, this merely refers to 
the method used to obtain the trade secret and is irrelevant to whether the secret is property.  
Arguably, this is analogous to a contracting party who engages in tortious conduct when 
breaching a contract such that the party is liable for both breach of contract and an 
independent tort.  Likewise, a party with a contractual right of access to real property could 
engage in trespass by exceeding the rights granted. See MILGRIM, supra note 19, at § 2.01, at 
2-4 (noting that property right underlies any trade secret action).  One leading commentator 
views trade secrets as property.  See id. at 2-2 to 2-4.1.  Judicial decisions have also 
recognized trade secrets as property.  See, e.g., Imed Corp. v. Systems Engg Assocs. Corp., 
602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) (noting that the purpose of trade secret law is to protect 
individual property rights in trade secrets); American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 
1057, 1059 (Miss. 1987) (finding that trade secrets are property). 
 319 The fact that a trade secret ceases to exist after public disclosure (due to breach of 
secrecy, reverse engineering or independent invention) does not affect its status as property. 
Trade secrets are a volatile form of property that requires constant vigilance on the part of 
the owner to maintain secrecy.  Cessation of secrecy destroys the trade secret property in the 
same manner that a fire destroys a house.  In both cases, the property at issue ceases to exist. 
See MILGRIM, supra note 19, at §2.01[2], at 2-8 to 2-11.  Additionally, this is analogous to a 
real property owner who must be diligent in protecting her property from trespassers to 
avoid losing ownership of her property under the doctrine of adverse possession. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.2, at 54 (5th ed. 
2001). 
 320 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. 
 321 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481 ([e]ncouragement of invention . . . [is one of] 
the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.); see also Imed Corp., 602 So. 2d at 346 
(explaining that the purpose of trade secret law to foster the development of new products 
and technology.). 
FINAL.BECKROD 1/10/02  4:24 PM 
2001] PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 61 
 
61 
Typically, the results of creative activity and research are not known 
in advance.  However, the knowledge that legal protection is 
available for some of the results of such activity encourages 
investment in such activities.322  With more protection available, the 
risk that the investment will not provide an adequate economic return 
is minimized.  The existence of different types of protection 
improves the likelihood that the investment will yield results that can 
be legally protected. 
Consequently, trade secret law facilitates innovation by allowing 
an enterprise to gain protection for things that would not receive 
protection via patent or copyright law.323  Additionally, trade secret 
law allows an enterprise to choose between various types of 
protection.324  For example, a company can choose to rely on patent 
law to protect a novel manufacturing process.325  This would provide 
protection for up to twenty years326 and requires full disclosure of the 
process as a condition of obtaining a patent.327  In contrast, trade 
secret protection does not involve any disclosure and the protection 
can potentially last indefinitely.328  But reliance on trade secret law 
runs the continuing risk of a third party developing the process via 
independent invention or reverse engineering.329  Learning the 
process by either method allows the third party to freely use the 
process as its own.330  Additionally, disclosure of the process to the 
industry destroys the existence of the trade secret and any 
corresponding economic advantage it provides.331  In contrast, 
independent invention and reverse engineering do not affect the 
 
 322 See sources cited supra note 321. 
 323 See Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (noting that trade secret law encourages 
innovation by supplementing patent law). 
 324 See ADELMAN, ET AL, supra note 152, at 51 (1998) (discussing how an inventor can 
opt to seek patent or rely on trade secret law to protect invention). 
 325 See id. 
 326 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). 
 327 See id. § 112. 
 328 See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(noting that trade secret protection can provide the same or more market dominance that a 
patent). 
 329 See supra text accompanying notes 301-303. 
 330 See id. 
 331 See In re Shalala, 996 F.2d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that public disclosure 
destroys property rights in trade secret). 
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rights of a patent owner.332  Consequently, protection of trade secrets 
furthers the goal of encouraging innovation and creativity, one of the 
broad underlying policies of intellectual property protection. 
Trade secrets typically involve information that must be protected 
from public disclosure.333  Since information is communicated either 
orally or in written form, any action to preserve a trade secret 
invariably must attempt to limit third-party communication of the 
trade secret.  Any legal action which can limit a persons ability to 
freely engage in communicating information has the potential to run 
afoul of free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.334  
Furthermore, limitations on speech, which are based on the content 
of the speech, are inherently suspect.335  Therefore, if a trade secret is 
involved, limiting speech via preliminary injunction or temporary 
restraining order may be problematic under conventional First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
The interplay between the First Amendment and property rights in 
trade secrets can be viewed from several perspectives.336  Arguably 
trade secret law prohibits certain conduct and is therefore based on a 
tort theory.337  Alternatively, the improper conduct triggering liability 
may be breach of an agreement, which is based on a contractual 
theory.  Arguably, the First Amendment protects speech not 
conduct.338  Therefore, if trade secret law is viewed from the 
 
 332 See ROGER E. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
164 (2d ed. 1993) (noting patents are protected against reverse engineering). 
 333 See Smith, supra note 294. 
 334 In Universal City Studios, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d at 226, the Court noted that the 
expressive content of computer code is incidental to its predominant character; therefore, the 
underlying rationales for the prior restraint doctrine are inapplicable to code.  Arguably, 
trade secrets are analogous in that the expressive or communicative aspect of a trade secret 
does not represent its predominant character.  Instead, a trade secret is more akin to 
commercial private property utilized by an enterprise to generate revenue. 
 335 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 11.2.1, at 758-59 (discussing distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws). 
 336 See ALLISON COFLMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS, 47-48 (1992) 
(discussing role of tort law in trade secret protection). 
 337 See id. § 3.5.1, at 37 (noting that if trade secret is disclosed, the obligation to respect 
its confidentiality can be stated expressly in the contract, or it can be implied by law). 
 338 But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 11.3.6.1, at 867-69 (stating that conduct 
such as using flag, armband or other symbol intended to convey a specific message may be 
First Amendment protected speech). 
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perspective that it makes certain conduct unlawful, any attempt by a 
trade secret owner to prohibit third-party disclosure of a trade secret 
is merely an attempt to prohibit conduct, not speech.339  A trade 
secret owner must limit disclosure of the trade secret if he or she 
wants to prevent destruction of any property interest.  Therefore, any 
limitations on speech rights are simply unavoidable consequences of 
the necessity of preserving a trade secret. 
The reliance on tort or contract theory implies the use of a liability 
rule with regard to a remedy.340  Typically, money damages are a 
remedy intended to make the injured party whole by granting the 
economic value of the lost trade secret.341  This allows someone who 
interferes with the rights of a trade secret owner to be held liable 
while preventing any interference with free speech rights via 
preliminary relief.342  Additionally, since the value of trade secrets is 
economic, a monetary recovery has the potential to fully compensate 
the trade secret owner.343  On its face, this provides a strong 
argument against allowing preliminary relief in trade secret actions. 
Nevertheless, even if a liability rule is utilized, in most cases 
damages cannot be quantified with sufficient specificity to establish 
a basis for an award.344  Even liability-based theories, such as 
contract, recognize this possibility and therefore use injunctive relief 
in limited cases.345  Typically, such injunctive relief is allowed, for 
example, in the form of specific performance, only if monetary 
damages are impossible to ascertain or would fail to fully 
compensate the injured party.346  While trade secrets by their nature 
 
 339 See id. 
 340 See generally AMEDEE E. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 427-459 (1st ed. 
1962) (discussing the application of remedies and damages for the disclosure of trade 
secrets). 
 341 See id. at 430-31 (noting remedies available include: damages for loss suffered 
because of breach of confidence or contract, an account of profits flowing to the defendant 
from such breach, and an injunction). 
 342 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. c (1995) (noting that 
the constitutional right of free speech can limit the scope of injunctive relief in unfair 
competition cases). 
 343 See TURNER, supra note 340, at 427-59. 
 344 See id. 
 345 See id. 
 346 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, at 660-61 (explaining that specific 
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are typically unknown to others in a particular industry, they provide 
an ongoing economic advantage; the value of the trade secret is hard 
to determine since it is difficult, if not impossible, to know when or 
if such a trade secret will be destroyed.347  Unforeseen technological 
advances may also render an existing trade secret valueless.348  
Additionally, trade secrets, pursuant to the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, are entitled to protection even if they only have potential 
commercial value.349  In light of the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of reducing a trade secret to a measurable monetary 
value, utilizing money damages after the fact as a remedy for trade 
secret misappropriation will often be misplaced.350  Consequently, 
preliminary relief is necessary; disclosure of the trade secret prior to 
a trial on the merits destroys the trade secret, leaving nothing to 
enjoin after the trial.351 
Alternatively, trade secrets are property; therefore, it is arguably 
appropriate to protect a trade secret under a property theory rather 
than under a liability theory.352  Under a property theory, it is the 
property owners right to exclude third parties from accessing, using 
or interfering with the property.353  The establishment of economic 
damages due to third-party action is not necessary since the property 
owners exclusive rights in the property are protected.  Protection of 
such rights is most appropriately accomplished with injunctive relief 
since any other remedy does not protect the rights at issue.354  In the 
case of trade secrets, any disclosure must be enjoined to prevent 
destruction of the trade secret owners property rights in the trade 
secret; unauthorized third-party disclosure of a trade secret is 
 
performance is an extraordinary remedy available in situations where money damages are 
inadequate); see also U.C.C. § 2-716, 1 B.U.L.A. 497 (1989) (stating that specific 
performance is allowed for breach of contract for unique goods). 
 347 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56. 
 348 See id. 
 349 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1990). 
 350 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56. 
 351 See Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that damage 
suffered by a business due to public disclosure of trade secrets cannot be remedied by an 
appellate court because the court cannot make the information secret again). 
 352 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 353 See U.C.C. § 2-403 (stating that a thief cannot transfer good title to a third party). 
 354 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
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analogous to trespassing on real property.355  Therefore, just as a real 
property owner is allowed to protect her property rights with 
injunctive relief prohibiting unauthorized invasion of the sanctity of 
her property, a trade secret owner should be allowed to enjoin 
unauthorized communication of her trade secret to protect her 
property rights.  The need to provide such protection for a trade 
secret is even more critical than providing such protection for real 
property because public disclosure of a trade secret essentially 
destroys any property interest in the trade secret.356  In contrast, 
trespassing on realty typically does not destroy the real property.  
Hence, preliminary relief is critical in a trade secret misappropriation 
action.  Absent preliminary relief, no guarantee exists than any 
property interest will exist at the conclusion of a trial on the merits. 
This analysis comports with the conventional view of intellectual 
property generally as property, thereby making injunctive relief 
available as a remedy to protect the property interests pursuant to a 
property theory.357  Nevertheless, mere reliance solely on a property 
theory is inadequate to justify preliminary relief in trade secret 
actions in light of the fact that such relief will often restrict speech.358  
The allowance of such relief requires a balancing of the fundamental 
importance of protecting commercial private property with 
minimizing restrictions on First Amendment rights. 
Typically, the only value of trade secrets is commercial in 
nature.359   They provide a degree of competitiveness in the 
marketplace, which enhances competition.360  Additionally, this 
encourages innovation by competitors to maintain marketplace 
viability.361  Failure to allow preliminary relief in a trade secret 
action undermines these policies.362  A trade secret owner would 
 
 355 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 356 See supra note 331. 
 357 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 211. 
 358 See In re Shalala, 996 F.2d at 965. 
 359 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1995). 
 360 See generally BARRETT, supra note 78, at 26 (facilitating marketplace competition is 
main purpose of intellectual property law). 
 361 See Kewannee Oil, 426 U.S. at 481. 
 362 See, e.g., Scott D. Mars, Trade Secrets, Preliminary Relief in Trade Secret Cases, 61 
TEX. B. J. 880, 884 (noting preliminary relief is powerful equitable remedy). 
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have to bear the risk of trade secret disclosure and the resulting 
marketplace injury with the only remedy being the potential for 
money damages upon prevailing at trial.363  This would discourage 
enterprises from relying on trade secrecy; justice delayed often 
amounts to a lack of justice.  This is exacerbated by the difficulty of 
ascertaining the monetary value of a trade secret.364  Furthermore, a 
party who improperly acquired a trade secret would have substantial 
bargaining power.365  In light of the fact that public disclosure 
destroys a trade secret, a trade secret owner may feel compelled to 
settle an action merely to avoid disclosure.  This would enable the 
trade secret misappropriator to engage in economic coercion because 
marketplace damage to an enterprise may be too great to absorb in 
the short run.366  Therefore, pursuing legal action resulting in 
uncertain damages in the distant future may not be a viable business 
option.367  Preliminary injunctions equalize the commercial playing 
field because the potential for economic coercion is removed.  The 
ability of a trade secret owner to interfere with competition by 
improperly asserting trade secret rights is checked by the basic 
requirements that must be established to obtain preliminary relief.368 
 
 363 See generally supra note 351 and accompanying text. 
 364 See Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for 
Disclosure in the Information Age, 18 REV. LITIG. 317, 326 (1999). 
 365 See Ruckelshaus v. Montsano Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984). 
 366 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433, 455-56 (1995). 
 367 See id. 
 368 Four-factor test for a preliminary injunction requires plaintiff to establish: (1) 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm or injury will result if injunction 
denied; (3) balance of hardships favors plaintiff; and (4) public interest favors granting 
injunction.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8 at 158.  It can be argued that once a 
likelihood of success is shown the other factors can be assumed to be satisfied.  In the usual 
case, irreparable injury will result since the value of a trade secret and the resulting injury 
from its disclosure cannot be easily and accurately quantified. This strongly suggests that 
the balance of hardships favors plaintiff. Finally, the public interest generally favors strong 
protection of trade secrets to provide an incentive for innovation for the benefit of the 
public. Judicial decisions seem to support this view by allowing preliminary relief in 
intellectual property cases simply upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits.  
See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d at 1174 (holding that in a copyright 
infringement claim, a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits raises a 
presumption of irreparable harm); Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1254 (prevailing 
view that a showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement or reasonable likelihood 
of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm); American Direct Mktg., 
Inc. v. Azad Intl, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 84, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that irreparable 
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Namely, the party seeking the preliminary relief must typically show 
a likelihood of success on the merits before such relief will be 
granted.369 
Protection of the underlying economic value of a trade secret 
requires the issuance of preliminary relief. Although an incidental 
restriction on free speech may result, such as in Lane,370 this must be 
balanced against the effect on the trade secret.  Disclosure prior to 
conclusion of a trial on the merits is permissible absent preliminary 
relief. The consequence of public disclosure of the trade secret is its 
total destruction.371  Therefore, on balance, the preservation of the 
private property interest embodied in a trade secret can only be 
protected by preliminary relief.  Any minor restriction on free speech 
must give way to protection of this private property interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Freedom of speech is a fundamentally important interest in our 
society that is necessary to maintain a democratic system of 
government.372  Free speech rights allow the news media to engage 
in unfettered reporting, which provides an important check on the 
activities of government.  It also allows the dissemination of 
information which facilitates the flow of information 373 and provides 
individuals with the ability to freely express their ideas and thoughts 
even if they are unpopular or contrary to prevailing viewpoints.  
Ultimately, society reaps the benefit of seeing and hearing numerous 
ideas that can help to both educate and inform individuals. 
 
 
injury is presumed in copyright actions, therefore, preliminary injunction is automatic once 
likelihood of success on merits is shown); id. at 91 (Irreparable injury usually follows 
almost inevitably in a trademark . . . infringement case once a strong likelihood of confusion 
has been shown because damage to reputation is difficult to prove or quantify.). 
 369 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 158 (discussing how several courts have held 
that likelihood of success on the merits is a prerequisite to preliminary relief). 
 370 See Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 745. 
 371 See supra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 372 See generally supra note 3. 
 373 See United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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Private property rights are also fundamentally important in an 
economic system based on free enterprise.374  The recognition of and 
strong protection afforded to private property under our legal system 
have been critical factors in the growth and development of our 
economy.375  Private property rights are an essential aspect of our 
economic system which facilitate development of business 
enterprises.376  Typically, private property enables businesses to 
create revenue and thereby engage in research and development 
activities that benefit society. 
Today, enterprises increasingly utilize intellectual property in 
addition to tangible property.377  Intellectual property, like tangible 
property, is typically viewed by a business as a useful asset in the 
generation of revenue.378  Law has therefore always protected such 
intellectual property.379  Absent such protection, little incentive 
would exist for the creation of intellectual property.380  
Consequently, an enterprise would be reluctant to make any 
investments in research and development, and ultimately the public 
would lose the benefits that flow from the creation of such property. 
Nevertheless, unlike real property and most tangible property, 
intellectual property often contains a communicative element since it 
comprises ideas, information, creativity and forms of expression.  It 
is this communicative aspect that conflicts, to some extent, with the 
freedom of speech right protected by the First Amendment. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has never viewed any right as 
absolute.381  Consistent with this view, the Court has recognized that 
even fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech, must be 
balanced against other important underlying policies.382  Likewise, 
 
 374 See generally supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 375 See G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., 958 F. 2d at 900. 
 376 See id. 
 377 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62. 
 378 See id. 
 379 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 380 See generally supra notes 145, 224 and 229. 
 381 See United States v. Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 385 (1947). 
 382 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (As cases arise, the . . .  
difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the policies against the rights.). 
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even private property rights are subject to limitations based on 
competing public policy interests.383  Nevertheless, preliminary relief 
in the form of injunctions or temporary restraining orders are 
typically denied when such First Amendment rights are involved.384  
Such preliminary relief is a common remedy when a party can 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.385  This relief 
minimizes injury by maintaining the status quo during the legal 
adjudication process.386  Nevertheless, under the prior restraint 
doctrine such relief is routinely denied when speech is involved.387 
This insures that lawful speech, protected by the First Amendment, is 
not temporarily enjoined during the adjudication process.388  
Arguably, this makes sense because of the impossibility of knowing 
conclusively if the speech at issue can be lawfully enjoined until the 
conclusion of the legal process. 
Preliminary relief is a commonly granted remedy in actions 
involving the infringement or misappropriation of intellectual 
property.389  Few courts have refused to allow such a remedy on the 
grounds that it would be a prior restraint.390  Nevertheless, 
preliminary relief to protect intellectual property may, in some cases, 
amount to a speech restriction in light of the communicative nature 
of much intellectual property.  The fundamental importance of both 
intellectual property and free speech rights necessitates that these 
rights be balanced so that the private property interests embodied in 
intellectual property can be protected while at the same time 
minimizing the intrusion into the freedom of speech arena. 
 
 383 See supra notes 52-54. 
 384 See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
 385 See Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173. 
 386 See supra notes 112 and 117. 
 387 See generally John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 
417 (1983) (arguing that injunctions against speech are presumptively unconstitutional 
because they are a type of prior restraint). 
 388 See id. 
 389 See, e.g., K & G Oil Tool Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W. 2d 782, 
790 (Tex. 1958) (True protection of a trade secret is a well-recognized objective of 
equity. . .). 
 390 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 551 (1993) (holding that prior restraint 
does not per se prohibit preliminary relief). 
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An examination of the various intellectual property laws indicates 
that limitations, which strike a balance between protecting both 
private property rights and free speech rights, are already built into 
these laws.391  Such limitations minimize the interference with free 
speech rights while providing adequate protection for intellectual 
property to insure an economic incentive exists for engaging in the 
development of creative and innovative property. 
Patent law primarily prohibits conduct 392 by allowing a patent 
owner to prohibit a third party from making, using, selling or 
offering for sale the invention protected by the patent.393  Anyone is 
free to discuss the invention or to explain how it operates. 
Information about the invention is public record.394  Consequently, 
the law has little impact on free speech rights.  Nevertheless, the 
right to prohibit offers to sell a patented invention can be considered 
a restriction on commercial speech.395  However, such speech will 
not generate revenue absent sale of the patented invention, which is 
conduct that can be enjoined without affecting freedom of speech.  
Therefore, prohibiting preliminary relief when a third party engages 
in such commercial speech is not problematic since such speech 
alone is unlikely to cause irreparable harm to the patent owners 
property.  
Copyright law specifically deals with the communication of 
information and other creative forms of expression.396  The economic 
value of copyrighted work depends on the ability to profit from 
controlling the reproduction and distribution of copies of the work.  
Therefore, failure to provide preliminary relief for copyrighted work 
can result in irreparable harm.  This reduces the economic incentive 
to produce creative things since this potential for economic reward 
provides the incentive for devoting time and resources to creative 
endeavors.  This reduction of economic incentives would ultimately 
be detrimental to the public. 
 
 391 See id. 
 392 See Schneider, 308 U.S.147. 
 393 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). 
 394 See id. 
 395 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (1985). 
 396 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 158. 
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Trademark law provides legal protection for words, phrases or 
symbols that create a mental association in the minds of 
consumers.397  Extensive marketing and advertising are typically 
required to develop a strong mental association with a trademark.398  
Therefore, unless the law provides protection for trademarks, little 
incentive exists for enterprises to devote resources to the creation and 
maintenance of trademarks. 
The marketplace value of a trademark is based on the mental 
association created in the minds of consumers by the trademark.399  
This is an intangible that is easily affected by the actions of third 
parties.400  Damage resulting to the mental association may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to undo.401  Hence, preliminary relief is 
necessary to prevent such damage to this mental association during 
the course of an action for trademark infringement. 
Trade secrets are broadly defined to protect information that is 
subject to reasonable secrecy efforts and which has economic value 
to an enterprise.402  Secrecy is the very heart of trade secret 
protection. Public disclosure of a trade secret destroys the trade 
secret.403  Therefore, preliminary relief in a trade secret 
misappropriation action is necessary to prevent destruction of the 
intellectual property prior to adjudication on the merits. 
 
 397 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 
1187 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 398 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
 399 See Charles D. Paglee, Chinese Trademark Law Revised: New Regulations Protect 
Well-Known Trademarks, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 37, 81 (noting that the value of 
trademark is dependent on its popularity). 
 400 See id. 
 401 See Sterns Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark Prods. Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077 (noting 
that consumers may be attracted to the competitors product based on the strength, goodwill 
and positive image established by trademark holder). 
 402 See Scarves by Vera, Inc., 544 F.2d 1167. 
 403 See supra note 331. 
